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1. Introduction: Background, Mandate of the Committee and Methodology of Work*  
During the fall of 2014, the Chair, the co-Chair, the Rapporteurs and some Committee members prepared a work-plan to 
serve as a basis for the first formal meeting of the Committee (after a small informal meeting during the combined ILA 
and American Society of International Law Meeting at the beginning of April 2014). The first formal meeting took place 
in The Hague, at the Institute for Global Justice, from 20 to 21 February 2015. The meeting attracted a good number of 
members and future members, some of whom took part via the Skype connection, while it was also attended by a number 
of observers. The initial work plan was intensely discussed during the meeting, since it would provide the direction for the 
work of the Committee. 
 
The mandate of the Committee is to provide an in-depth study on the level of implementation of existing norms of 
international law – be it customary international law, treaty law or soft law – as ascertained and interpreted by the ILA 
Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which completed its work at the ILA Biennial Conference held in Sofia 
in August 2012.1 In particular, the present Committee aims at carefully looking at what legal, quasi-legal and practical 
barriers potentially block the road for existing international legal standards to translate into actual protection of 
indigenous peoples in a number of countries throughout the world. While the former Committee ascertained that in many 
countries significant practice and opinio juris have developed which are consistent with the provisions of the 2007 United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),2 and, with respect to some rights, have risen to the 
                                                 
* This Section is based on the Committee’s “Report of the Meeting held in The Hague on 20-21 February 2015”, circulated among 
Committee members in September 2015. 
1 The documents produced by the ILA Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples are available at <http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024> (accessed 11 June 2016). 
2 UN General Assembly Res. 61/295 of 13 September 2007. 
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level of customary international law, a range of problems remain which often hinder the full realization of the UNDRIP 
provisions and pertinent customary international law. Such problems need to be addressed taking as guidance ILA 
Resolution No. 5/2012,3 which endorsed with a virtually unanimous vote and without any objections the findings and 
conclusions arising from the work of the former Committee. As to actual practical problems, one can refer to the fact that 
indigenous peoples are often confronted with discrimination and social, economic, and political marginalization. Other 
major violations of their rights relate to denial of justice, such as arbitrary arrests, unjust imprisonment and related 
inhumane treatment, denial of liberty of association, and collective punishment. In some cases, such violations arise solely 
as a result of their efforts to promote or safeguard their human rights. Other violations relate to reluctance shown by 
governments to recognize and implement in practice indigenous peoples’ rights to lands and resources or cultural rights, 
as well as to lack of access to schools and health facilities, political recognition, representation, and participation. Often, 
the rights of indigenous peoples to their lands, territories, and resources have not been secured, leaving them with little or 
no access to natural resources on their territories and to their traditional economies. In some cases, they are forcibly 
removed from their lands in order for others, including foreign investors and multinational companies, to exploit their 
resources. Given the inter-related, interconnected, indivisible and inter-dependent nature of indigenous peoples’ human 
rights, each violation of the latter reverberates on the whole social and cultural structure of the communities concerned. 
Denial of land rights, in particular, translates into the impossibility for indigenous peoples to enjoy their internationally 
recognized cultural and other rights, to maintain a livelihood of their own choice, to determine their own priorities for 
development, or, even more important, to foster and transmit their cultural identity to future generations. A key issue − in 
many ways: the issue − therefore relates to land rights, which are the focus of the mandate of the Committee, embedded in 
the notion that all indigenous peoples’ human rights have a strong cultural dimension, the recognition of which is at the 
foundation of their very existence. At the same time, however, the approach of the Committee is based on the assumption 
that all the different human rights recognized by international law in favour of indigenous peoples are strictly interrelated 
and inseparable from each other. This relates, inter alia, to the interplay between economic and cultural rights. 
 
In terms of legal standards used by the Committee to ascertain the level of effective implementation of the rights of 
indigenous peoples in the real world, priority is given to the standards established by the UNDRIP. However, attention is 
also devoted to other pertinent international legal standards, particularly pertinent rules of customary international law 
(which reflect some of the standards provided for by the UNDRIP), ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries of 1989 (ILO Convention 169),4 as well as other international instruments and/or 
rules which are directly or indirectly relevant to indigenous peoples, including (but not limited to) the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)5 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR),6 the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,7 the 1989 Convention 
on the Rights of the Child,8 the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity9 and its Nagoya Protocol,10 as well as bilateral 
treaties between the states and indigenous peoples. Furthermore, the case-law of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR) is devoted special attention, together with the practice of other human rights monitoring bodies, 
including the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee of 
the Rights of the Child. Last but not least, the interplay between the domestic, national, regional and international level is 
also considered. More in general, the Committee’s approach consists in considering any type of norms which are relevant 
to its study, irrespective of whether these are strictly legally binding or not. 
 
As for the methodology used by the Committee, a range of cases have been studied, in order to collect empirical material 
for providing a response to the question concerning the way and the extent to which international legal obligations on the 
rights of indigenous peoples are actually implemented at the domestic level. The Committee has selected a number of key 
case studies from all regions of the world, so as to ensure that the study provides global coverage of the status of 
indigenous peoples on the planet. The study of the said cases has been carried out through applying an interdisciplinary 
analysis of them, taking into account relevant social, cultural and – in particular – legal factors, ranging from indigenous 
customs, practices, land tenure systems and law, as well as national, regional, and international law with a view to 
identifying an effective resolution of the existing conflicts hindering the effective realization of indigenous peoples’ 
                                                 
3 ILA Resolution No. 5/2012, available at <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024> (accessed 11 June 2016). 
4 The full text of the Convention is available in the ILO website, at 
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169> (accessed 20 May 2016). 
5 999 UNTS 171. 
6 993 UNTS 3. 
7 660 UNTS 195. 
8 1577 UNTS 3. 
9 1760 UNTS 79. 
10 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010, available at <https://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf> (accessed 
20 May 2016). 
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rights. In the context of this work, particular attention is devoted to cultural factors as well as to the cultural implications 
arising from violations of indigenous peoples’ rights, culture being the cornerstone of the very existence of those peoples. 
Consideration is also paid to economic factors and actors, with a focus on States and third parties, including multinational 
companies, and the role they are playing, positively and negatively, in the lives of indigenous communities. The 
examination of the selected case studies is also aimed at identifying and selecting “best practices” relating to countries 
that have implemented or are attempting to implement the UNDRIP standards and provisions and imagining how such 
practices could be applied to other areas, taking into account existing cultural and social differences. Furthermore, through 
comparing the different case studies, the Committee aims at drawing general conclusions concerning whether and to 
which extent the recent evolution of international law in the field of indigenous peoples’ rights has led to further concrete 
outcomes translating into positive impacts on the lives of indigenous peoples and communities. Last but not least, the 
Committee also pursues the objective of defining strategies which might be easily applied worldwide by a variety of legal 
researchers and activists, as well as to contribute to the prevention of future violations of indigenous peoples’ rights. 
 
2. The Current Status of International Law on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples** 
An inclusive summary of the current status and rights of indigenous peoples under international law is provided by ILA 
Resolution No. 5/2012,11 which, as noted in the previous section, is used as guidance for the work of the Committee. 
Resolutions of the International Law Association have been recognized as evidence of international law under Article 
38(1)(d) of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute. The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States affirms this characterization.12 As stated by Graf Vitzthum, global resolutions of a body as qualified and diverse as 
the International Law Association are stating a rare consensus amongst, at times, radically different cultures and value 
traditions, and thus should be especially appreciated,13 transcending the relevance of the writings of individual scholars. 
This is particularly true when, as in this case, a resolution passes not only uncontested, but with emphatic support.14 
According to Conclusion no. 1 of the Resolution, indigenous peoples “are holders of collective human rights aimed at 
ensuring the preservation and transmission to future generations of their cultural identity and distinctiveness. Members of 
indigenous peoples are entitled to the enjoyment of all internationally recognised human rights – including those specific 
to their indigenous identity – in a condition of full equality with all other human beings”. The legal standards defining the 
nature and content of such rights are enshrined in the UNDRIP, which – as is well known – is in principle a declaration of 
non-binding character. However, although as a whole the UNDRIP “cannot yet be considered as a statement of existing 
customary international law […] it includes several key provisions which correspond to existing State obligations under 
customary international law”.15 These obligations concern the areas of self-determination, autonomy or self-government, 
cultural rights and identity, land rights as well as reparation, redress and remedies.16 In particular, Conclusion No. 7 of 
ILA Resolution No. 5/2012 affirms that “States must comply – pursuant to customary and applicable conventional 
international law – with the obligation to recognise, respect, safeguard, promote and fulfil the rights of indigenous 
peoples to their traditional lands, territories and resources”. 
 
As for the provisions included in the UNDRIP which do not yet correspond to customary international law, they  
 
“nevertheless express the aspirations of the world’s indigenous peoples, as well as of States, in their move to 
improve existing standards for the safeguarding of indigenous peoples’ human rights. States recognised them in a 
‘declaration’ subsumed ‘within the framework of the obligations established by the Charter of the United Nations 
to promote and protect human rights on a non-discriminatory basis’ and passed with overwhelming support by the 
United Nations General Assembly. This genesis leads to an expectation of maximum compliance by States and the 
other relevant actors. The provisions included in UNDRIP represent the parameters of reference for States to 
define the scope and content of their existing obligations – pursuant to customary and conventional international 
law – towards indigenous peoples”.17 
 
The fact that the UNDRIP represents more than a mere soft-law instrument of hortatory character is corroborated not only 
by the Preamble to the UNDRIP itself – stating that, in adopting the UNDRIP, the U.N. General Assembly was guided 
“by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and good faith in the fulfilment of the obligations 
assumed by States in accordance with the Charter”18 – but also by the practice of international human rights monitoring 
                                                 
** This Section has been written by Federico Lenzerini, Co-Rapporteur of the Committee. 
11 ILA Resolution No. 5/2012, n. 3 above. 
12 American Law Institute, Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 103 Reporters’ Notes  No. 1 (1987). 
13 W. Graf Vitzthum, in W. Graf Vitzthum (ed.), Völkerrecht (3d ed.), Berlin/New York, 2004, p. 72, para. 147. 
14 S. Wiessner, “The State and Indigenous Peoples: The Historic Significance of ILA Resolution No. 5/2012,” in M. Breuer et al. (eds.), 
Der Staat im Recht  Berlin, 2013, p. 1368. 
15 ILA Resolution No. 5/2012, n. 3 above, Conclusion No. 2. 
16 See ILA Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, “The Hague Conference (2010) Interim Report”, n. 1 above, p. 43. 
17 See ILA Resolution No. 5/2012, n. 3 above, Conclusion No. 3. 
18 See first recital of the UNDRIP Preamble. 
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bodies. For instance, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has affirmed that proper realization of the 
right to take part in cultural life established by Article 15.1(a) ICESCR presupposes that “all indigenous peoples […] have 
the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human 
rights law, as well as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”.19 In a similar vein, the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has used the UNDRIP as parameter of reference for defining the 
nature and scope of indigenous peoples’ rights,20 while the Committee on the Rights of the Child has affirmed the 
Declaration as international standard on the basis of which States should “adopt a rights-based approach to indigenous 
children”.21 
 
In addition to customary international law and the UNDRIP, indigenous peoples’ rights are affirmed and protected by ILO 
Convention 169, which provides in particular for a wide measure of cultural rights, land rights and labour rights for 
indigenous communities and their members. The problem with ILO Convention 169 is that, at the moment of this writing, 
it has been ratified by 22 States only, fifteen of which are Latin American countries.22 Outside such a geographical 
context, therefore, the impact played by the Convention, so far, has been virtually imperceptible. However, for the 
purposes of the work of the present Committee, ILO Convention 169 is to be recognized of significant weight especially 
with regard to the Latin American geographical context, where it has a notable impact. 
 
Other human rights treaty provisions contribute to reinforcing international standards on indigenous peoples’ human 
rights especially thanks to their evolutionary interpretation as provided by competent monitoring bodies. It is the case, for 
example, of Article 27 ICCPR23 – interpreted by the Human Rights Committee as implying the existence of an obligation 
“to protect the identity of a minority and the rights of its members to enjoy and develop their culture and language and to 
practice their religion”,24 as well as to safeguard all different forms in which culture manifests, “including a particular 
way of life associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include 
such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law”.25 To a similar extent, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has interpreted Article 15 ICESCR as presupposing a State 
obligation to 
 
take measures to guarantee that the exercise of the right to take part in cultural life takes due account of the values 
of cultural life, which may be strongly communal or which can only be expressed and enjoyed as a community by 
indigenous peoples. The strong communal dimension of indigenous peoples’ cultural life is indispensable to their 
existence, well-being and full development, and includes the right to the lands, territories and resources which they 
have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired […] States […] must therefore take measures to 
recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop, control and use their communal lands, 
territories and resources, and, where they have been otherwise inhabited or used without their free and informed 
consent, take steps to return these lands and territories […] [States should also] respect the principle of free, prior 
and informed consent of indigenous peoples in all matters covered by [indigenous peoples’] specific rights.26 
 
Another relevant example is provided by the practice of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD Committee), which has held that, in order to prevent discrimination against indigenous peoples, States have an 
obligation to take a number of measures, aimed in particular at 
 
(a) Recogniz[ing] and respect[ing] indigenous distinct culture, history, language and way of life as an enrichment 
of the State's cultural identity and to promote its preservation; (b) Ensur[ing] that members of indigenous peoples 
are free and equal in dignity and rights and free from any discrimination, in particular that based on indigenous 
                                                 
19 See General Comment No. 21, “Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)”, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 of 21 December 2009, para. 7 (emphasis added). 
20 See Communication No. 276/2003, Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on 
behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 25 November 2009, available at 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2010_africa_commission_ruling_0.pdf> (accessed 20 May 2016), passim. 
21 See General Comment No. 11 (2009), “Indigenous children and their rights under the Convention”, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/11 of 12 
February 2009, para. 82. 
22 See <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314> (accessed 20 May 
2016). 
23 Article 27 ICCPR establishes that “[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist persons belonging to such 
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practise their own religion, or to use their own language”. 
24 See General Comment No. 23(50) (art. 27), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 of 26 April 1994, para. 6.2. 
25 Ibid., para. 7. 
26 See General Comment No. 21, “Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)”, n. 19 above, paras. 36-37 (footnotes omitted). 
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origin or identity; (c) Provid[ing] indigenous peoples with conditions allowing for a sustainable economic and 
social development compatible with their cultural characteristics; (d) Ensur[ing] that members of indigenous 
peoples have equal rights in respect of effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to 
their rights and interests are taken without their informed consent; (e) Ensur[ing] that indigenous communities can 
exercise their rights to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs and to preserve and to practise 
their languages.27 
 
Last but not least, the practice of the IACtHR is worth emphasizing, especially as regards the interpretation provided by 
the Court to Article 21 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights,28 considered as covering protection of land 
rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral territories.2930 
 
Outside the context of human rights law stricto sensu, Article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity31 is worth 
mentioning. According to this provision, in the context of in-situ conservation of biological diversity, “[s]ubject to its 
national legislation, [each State party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate,] respect, preserve and maintain 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and 
involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices”. This provision has been implemented 
in 2010 through the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity.32 
 
As regards the specific human rights standards concerning indigenous peoples – which are to be mainly conceived as 
collective rights – the most important ones, as detailed by ILA Resolution No. 5/2012, are the following: 
(a) right to self-determination, “conceived as the right [of indigenous peoples] to decide their political status and to 
determine what their future will be, in compliance with relevant rules of international law and the principles of equality 
and non-discrimination”;33 
(b) right to autonomy or self-government, “which translates into a number of prerogatives necessary in order to 
secure the preservation and transmission to future generations of their cultural identity and distinctiveness. These 
prerogatives include, inter alia, the right to participate in national decision-making with respect to decisions that may 
affect them, the right to be consulted with respect to any project that may affect them and the related right that projects 
significantly impacting their rights and ways of life are not carried out without their prior, free and informed consent, as 
well as the right to regulate autonomously their internal affairs according to their own customary laws and to establish, 
maintain and develop their own legal and political institutions”;34 
(c) right to cultural identity (in all its elements, including cultural heritage), which must be “safeguarded in a way 
that is consistent with the perspectives, needs and expectations of the specific indigenous peoples [concerned]”,35 so as to 
allow them to keep such identity genuine and transmit it to future generations without external interferences; 
(d) right to traditional lands, territories and resources (land rights), “which include the right to restitution of the 
ancestral lands, territories and resources of which they have been deprived in the past. Indigenous peoples’ land rights 
must be secured in order to preserve the spiritual relationship of the community concerned with its ancestral lands, which 
is an essential prerequisite to allow such a community to retain its cultural identity, practices, customs and institutions”;36 
(e) right to establish their own educational institutions and media, as well as to provide education to indigenous 
children in their traditional languages and according to their own traditions;37 
                                                 
27 See General Recommendation No. XXIII: Indigenous Peoples, 18 August 1997, available at 
<http://www.minoritycentre.org/sites/default/files/cerd_gen_rec_23_indigenous.pdf> (accessed 21 May 2016), para. 4. 
28 O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36. Article 21, concerning the right to property, states at para. 1 that “[e]veryone has the right to the use and 
enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society”. 
29 Among the many pertinent judgments see Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Series C No. 79, 
Judgment of 31August 2001; Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Series C No. 124, Judgment of 17 June 2005; 
Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Series C No. 146, Judgment of 29 March 2006; Case of the Saramaka 
People v. Suriname, Series C No. 172, Judgment of 28 November 2007; Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay, Series C No. 214, Judgment of 24 August 2010; Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Series C 
No. 245, Judgment of 27 June 2012. 
30 For a more comprehensive assessment of the relevant practice, see ILA Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, “The Hague 
Conference (2010) Interim Report”, n. 1 above, passim. 
31 See n. 9 above. 
32 See n. 10 above. 
33 See ILA Resolution No. 5/2012, n. 3 above, Conclusion No. 4. 
34 Ibid., Conclusion No. 5. 
35 Ibid., Conclusion No. 6. 
36 Ibid., Conclusion No. 7. 
37 Ibid., Conclusion No. 8. 
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(f) right to reparation and redress “for wrongs they have suffered, including rights relating to lands taken or 
damaged without their free, prior and informed consent. Effective mechanisms for redress – established in conjunction 
with the peoples concerned – must be available and accessible in favour of indigenous peoples. Reparation must be 
adequate and effective, and, according to the perspective of the indigenous communities concerned, actually capable of 
repairing the wrongs they have suffered”.38 
 
Hence, the rights just listed represent the main standards that States have to comply with vis-à-vis indigenous peoples. 
However, they do not exhaust the list of State obligations existing in the field of indigenous peoples’ rights, as others 
ensue directly or indirectly from existing pertinent instruments and rules, including instruments which may be considered 
sui generis, i.e. “treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors”.39 
With respect to the latter, ILA Resolution No. 5/2012 affirms that “States must cooperate in good faith with indigenous 
peoples in order to give full recognition and execution to treaties and agreements concluded with indigenous peoples in a 
manner respecting the spirit and intent of the understanding of the indigenous negotiators as well as the living nature of 
the solemn undertakings made by all parties”.40 It is important to note that, according to the preferred interpretation, the 
treaties and agreements in point “retain their original character as international legal agreements, with the attendant 
consequences of customary international law governing their validity, interpretation and termination”.41 
As final remark, it is worth reiterating that, generally speaking, the rights of indigenous peoples cannot be considered in 
isolation from each other, “for the reason that – in light of the holistic vision of life of indigenous peoples – [such rights] 
are all strictly interrelated with each other as building blocks of the unique Circle of Life representing the heart of 
indigenous peoples’ identity, to the extent that ‘the change of one of its elements affects the whole’”.42 
 
3. Analysis of Case Studies*** 
 
LATIN-AMERICA 
 
The Indigenous Territory and Natural Park TIPNIS, Bolivia 
(by Alexandra Tomaselli and Rainer Hofmann, with the contribution of Ebun Abolarin) 
Bolivia has incorporated UNDRIP into its domestic legislation, with Law No. 3760 of 2007. The Territorio Indígena y 
Parque Nacional Isiboro-Secure (TIPNIS) is a recognized National Park, a demarcated Indigenous Communitarian Native 
Land, and home to approximately 60-70 indigenous communities. The construction of a highway that crosses TIPNIS in 
the middle began in June 2011. The project was approved without any prior consultation, and after two indigenous 
marches, a contested process of consultation was organized in late 2012. However, although the construction of the 
highway appeared to be blocked subsequently, the works in the first stretch continued. No compensation or redress 
mechanism for the affected indigenous communities is currently foreseen. Indigenous lawsuits in domestic courts so far 
have been declared inadmissible. Therefore, the TIPNIS case appears to be one of the clearest instances of misapplication 
of the right to consultation and to land of indigenous peoples in one country that apparently would have the best legal 
framework protecting these specific and all other indigenous peoples’ rights. In other words, this is a case in which all the 
legal guarantees were in place, but they were neither implemented nor respected, translating into a violation of a number 
of internationally recognized rules protecting the rights of indigenous peoples, including the rights to self-determination, 
autonomy or self-government, land rights, as well as the specific right according to which projects significantly impacting 
indigenous peoples’ rights and ways of life must not be carried out without their prior, free and informed consent. This is 
a flagrant violation not only of international law, but also of Bolivian domestic law, by virtue of the fact that – as 
previously mentioned – the adoption of Law No. 3760 of 2007 has attributed binding force to the whole UNDRIP as law 
of the country. As a consequence, in December 2015, Deputy Horacio Poppe Inch filed Supreme Decree No. 2298/2015 – 
which introduced the possibility for the administration to opt out of the consultation procedure with indigenous 
communities – with action of unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court for alleged violation of several articles of 
the Constitution, of Articles 3, 5, 6 and 8 of ILO Convention 169, as well as of Articles 18, 19 and 40 UNDRIP. 
 
National politics played and plays a large role in the road construction via the TIPNIS. Alternative routes would exist – 
and had been actually suggested from various parts – which would have preserved indigenous peoples’ rights without 
                                                 
38 Ibid., Conclusion No. 10. 
39 See Article 37 UNDRIP. 
40 See Conclusion No. 9. 
41 See ILA Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, “The Hague Conference (2010) Interim Report”, n. 1 above, p. 35. 
42 Ibid., p. 43, quoting the Indigenous Peoples’ Earth Charter, Kari-Oka Conference, 25-30 May 1992, available at 
<http://www.dialoguebetweennations.com/IR/english/KariOcaKimberley/KOCharter.html> (accessed 21 May 2016), para. 56. 
*** Each case study is presented in this section in an edited version based on the original studies written by the authors indicated under 
the title of each case. The work of editing has been carried out by the rapporteurs of the Committee, Federico Lenzerini and Timo 
Koivurova. The integral case studies are available on file with the respective authors as well as with the chairs and rapporteurs of the 
Committee. Some of them are available on the Committee’s web page, at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1048 
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significantly affecting the government’s development plans. In particular, the suggestion of constructing a railroad along 
the Park borders appeared to be very sustainable. This would be highly desirable, given that the construction of the 
highway without crossing in between an indigenous territory and a natural Park that is so rich in biodiversity would be 
clearly the best solution. The insistence on crossing the Park sadly suggests that the main reason behind this project is, in 
reality, to connect the coca fields in the area. 
 
Land and Water Rights in Chile 
(by Alexandra Tomaselli and Rainer Hofmann, with the contribution of Federico Lenzerini) 
Chile has not yet granted constitutional recognition to the indigenous peoples that live within its borders. Thus, 
indigenous peoples in Chile enjoy the rights recognized in domestic legislation and more specifically in the Indigenous 
Law No.19.253 of 5 October 1993 (Ley sobre Protección, Fomento y Desarrollo de los Indígenas, but mainly known as 
Ley Indígena). However, in 2008 Chile ratified ILO Convention 169. This prompted a new debate on indigenous rights 
and a wave of initiatives aimed at further protecting indigenous peoples. Chile also voted in favour of the UNDRIP when 
the latter was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 2007. 
 
This, however, did not eliminate the problems existing in Chile concerning the implementation of indigenous peoples’ 
rights, particularly land rights. Indeed, indigenous water and land rights are particularly undermined in a country in which 
watercourses and underground natural resources represent vital aspects of the national economy. In 2009, the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur James Anaya underlined the problematic construction of hydro-electric plants and other 
environmentally hazardous projects on indigenous peoples’ lands; the absence of general indigenous water rights; and, in 
a specific section, the issue of Mapuche land occupations followed by police repression. Furthermore, he stressed the need 
to adopt a procedure for the recognition of traditionally occupied land, an aspect also emphasized during the fifth human 
rights periodic review of Chile, and formally guaranteed by the Indigenous Law (Article 12.2).43 
 
As regards water rights, Article 64 of the above-mentioned Indigenous Law recognizes a special protection for the water 
rights of the indigenous peoples living in the North. However, in recent times the further desertification of the northern 
areas of Chile and the problems caused by the indefinite appropriation of water rights have prompted civil society 
organizations to insistently demand a reform of the Water Code (Código de Aguas). The main achievements in 2015 have 
been the works of the Commission for Hydric Resources and Desertification (Comisión de Recursos Hídricos) on the 
draft laws to reform the Water Code, which, inter alia, would establish, if approved, the recognition of the right to water 
as a human right, the prioritization of the use of water for human consumption, and the introduction of a 30-year limit for 
water concessions, thus eliminating permanent water rights. Against this background, since 2009 the Chilean Court of 
Appeals and the Supreme Court started to produce an extremely evolving and interesting jurisprudence regarding 
indigenous land and water rights, as well as their (related) right to consultation. In late 2009, the Chilean Supreme Court 
recognized the “ancestral water rights” of the Aymara indigenous community Chusmiza y Usmagama, basing its 
arguments on Articles 13.2 and 15.1 of the ILO Convention 169 (indigenous land as “habitat”, which thus includes also 
the watercourses), also confirming that the reference to the indigenous territories in Article 64 of the Indigenous Law is 
not limited to registered properties, but also to those lands traditionally used by indigenous peoples. In the same period, in 
a case concerning the logging of native trees close to a land belonging to a Mapuche indigenous community, the Chilean 
Supreme Court condemned the logging company Sociedad Palermo Itda for damages to Mapuche sacred sites and thus 
adverse effects to the practice of traditional medicine, on the basis of Articles 13-14 of ILO Convention 169 and other 
international instruments, including the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination. In mid-2010, the Court of Appeal of Valdivia found the Environmental National 
Commission guilty of waste allocation in the area contiguous to Mapuche lands and the consequent destruction of a 
ceremonial area, mentioning Articles 6.1.a, 6.2 and 7.1 of ILO Convention 169 and Article 25 UNDRIP; in particular, the 
Court stated that the indigenous peoples concerned should have been duly consulted, in good faith and according to the 
specific situation with the aim of reaching an agreement or their consent regarding the concerned measure. The Supreme 
Court upheld this decision in January 2011. In late 2014, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the Peasant Community 
Diaguita of Huascoaltinos against the Environmental Evaluation Commission of the third region (Atacama), which had 
authorized the construction of an open-pit mine of gold and copper onto 2,463 hectares of land (including large parts of 
indigenous territories) without any (due) consultation with the affected indigenous peoples – in violation of Articles 6, 7 
and 15 of ILO Convention 169. 
 
The jurisprudence just examined may surely be framed as a good practice. Irrespective of whether the plaintiffs had 
directly claimed the application of the ILO Convention 169, which, as mentioned, had prompted an extensive debate 
within this country, the courts referred either to other provisions of this treaty or to other instruments, including the 
UNDRIP. Indeed, although relevant domestic law is far from matching the international standards, the Chilean domestic 
                                                 
43 See James Anaya, “Informe del Relator Especial sobre la situación de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales de los 
indígenas”, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/34/Add.6 of 5 October 2009. 
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courts completed the understanding and the application of the domestic protection of indigenous water and land rights via 
the reference to the international standards. Indeed, the practice of Chilean courts appears to be consistent with the 
standards set by the UNDRIP, particularly with articles 20 (right of indigenous peoples to be secure in the enjoyment of 
their own means of subsistence and development), 25 (which explicitly refers to waters), 26 (land rights) and 32.2 
(consultation, cooperation, prior free and informed consent with respect to any project affecting their lands or territories 
and other resources, including water). It may be reasonably argued here that the Chilean case law may potentially 
positively influence international standardization of the application of indigenous water and land rights, as the evolving 
jurisprudence developed by Chilean courts may contribute to the fine-tuning of the content and the application of 
indigenous water and land rights in other parts of the world. 
 
Gas of Camisea in Territories of Indigenous Peoples in Isolation: Gaps in Legislation and Obligations of Peru 
(by Gloria Huamán Rodrígez and René Kuppe) 
The Lower Urubamba area in the south-eastern part of the Peruvian Amazon has been inhabited for immemorial times by 
peoples who live far from any contact with today’s dominant society. Those nomad peoples are on the move through vast 
stretches of ancestral territories in search of resources for their subsistence. In the 1980’s, the Peruvian government 
initiated one of its most ambitious projects called Gas of Camisea, for which it has issued licenses in favour of 
transnational companies for exploration and exploitation of this hydrocarbon precisely in territories inhabited by peoples 
in voluntary isolation. Since 1996 this project has gained huge support by political leaders, and is seen as one of the 
engines for economic growth in the country. It is said to have a number of advantages, ranging from industrial 
development to the fact of satisfying the needs of social projects and national energy demand. 
 
During the development of the Camisea project, several groups who used to live in isolation have been forcibly contacted 
by workers of Camisea and others that took advantage of the lack of clear protection norms – causing serious suffering of 
chronic diseases and a high death toll. The establishment of a weak territorial reserve – an area where indigenous peoples 
live voluntarily in isolation in order to use their natural resources – has not changed the serious effects of an invasive 
industry. Far from recognizing these peoples’ right to their ancestral territories, the Peruvian State has approved new 
exploration and exploitation activities for hydrocarbons in Block 88, which is superimposed to the territorial reserve 
meant for the Kugapakori, Nahua, Nanti and other peoples living in isolation, producing an imminent danger of extinction 
for these peoples. In addition, the central government has irregularly given its approval to an expansion of the project 
which allows the consortium to open frontlines of exploration of new gas fields inside the territorial reserve. Even the 
adoption of Law 28736 on the Protection of Indigenous and Original Peoples in situation of isolation or initial contact in 
May 2006 has not had any significant impact, as this law has introduced the concept of “indigenous reserves”, which have 
access to special protection only pursuant to official recognition on the basis of an administrative process, and so far the 
Peruvian state has not established a single indigenous reserve. 
 
The Peruvian state is clearly not fulfilling its international obligations to protect, respect and guarantee the human rights 
of indigenous peoples living in isolation. In order to comply with existing international standards, the immediate response 
which should be given by the State in this situation would be to declare the whole areas inhabited by indigenous peoples 
in isolation since time immemorial as intangible territories or protected territorial reserves, and to establish buffer zones 
around the said territories which would prevent third parties from entering, consistent with the Guidelines for the 
Protection of Indigenous Peoples in Isolation and Initial Contact in the Amazon Region, the Gran Chaco and the Eastern 
Region of Paraguay.44 The intangibility of this territory is not a particular right of indigenous peoples in isolation, but the 
most appropriate measure to achieve the ends of the UNDRIP and other relevant international rules as well as to 
implement a number of general indigenous human rights, like the right to life, cultural survival, and rights to health, food 
security and use of territories and resources. It is to be noted that Peru ratified ILO Convention 169 in 1994,45 but has 
never opened consultation with the affected indigenous peoples during the different steps of the Camisea project. Neither 
ILO Convention 169 nor the UNDRIP make any specific references to the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples 
in isolation. However, as a matter of fact, we have to consider how human rights rules and standards protecting 
indigenous peoples in general are relevant for isolated peoples, especially considering their particular situation of high 
vulnerability. On the other hand, it is obvious that the right to consultation cannot be easily put into practice when it 
comes to isolated indigenous groups, as establishing physical contacts with them would endanger their health and 
undermine their current independent political and social situation. However, their opinion on the issue should be quite 
explicit, as it is freely expressed through maintaining their isolation, and, as such, it should be respected. This 
                                                 
44 Result of the consultations by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the region: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela, May 2012, available (in Spanish) at <http://acnudh.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/Directrices-de-Protecci%C3%B3n-para-los-Pueblos-Ind%C3%ADgenas-en-Aislamiento-y-en-Contacto-
Inicial.pdf> (accessed 26 May 2016), para. 53(a). 
45 See n. 22 above. 
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notwithstanding, at present the project Camisea continues to be carried out, even if it is performed in blatant violation of 
internationally recognized rights of indigenous peoples. 
 
Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador/Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador 
(by Christina Binder, with the contribution of Jane A. Hofbauer) 
The case of Burlington v. Ecuador represents a unique example of the triangular relationship between investors, States 
and indigenous communities, and has been investigated both from an investment law and human rights perspective. It thus 
bears particular relevance in delineating the scope of the rights and obligations of the respective parties in the context of 
resource development projects/foreign investments which have an impact on indigenous communities. Moreover, it also 
constitutes an example of the overlapping of different judicial bodies and non-judicial forums regarding a particular set of 
facts. While in theory this should increase the level of protection offered to the affected (indigenous) communities, 
difficulties arise due the specific mandates of the respective bodies and their treatment of the absent third party as an 
“externality” to the proceedings. 
 
Article 57 of the amended 2008 Constitution of Ecuador accords a broad range of rights to indigenous peoples, including, 
at para. 7, a right to “free, prior and informed consultation within a reasonable period of time, on the plans and programs 
for prospecting, producing and marketing non-renewable resources located on their lands and which could have an 
environmental or cultural impact on them”. This notwithstanding, disparities continue to exist particularly with regard to 
the right to free, prior and informed consultation in the context of hydrocarbons, which has been implemented through 
Executive Decree 1247,46 understanding the goal of the consultation process to be participation and not consent. A further 
concern relates to the matter of drafting of said decree, as indigenous communities were not consulted about the law itself, 
and to the envisioned outcome as “any agreements which may be reached must be based on pre-existing public policy 
measures”.47 
 
The facts of the case of Burlington v. Ecuador were investigated by, first, an ICSID arbitral tribunal and, subsequently, 
the IACtHR. The Burlington Resources award by the ICSID arbitral tribunal48 in the end dismissed Burlington Resources’ 
claims that Ecuador had failed to provide full protection and security to its investment against the violent resistance by the 
affected indigenous groups on procedural grounds, and thus did not assess whether indigenous interests had any role to 
play on substantive issues. The IACtHR reached a landmark judgment in 2012 with regard to the rights of indigenous 
peoples in the context of resource exploitation projects.49 The Court emphasized that, in order for the requirement of 
effective participation to establish a true dialogue between the parties and be based on mutual trust, it was essential to 
remember that consultations had to be carried out in good faith, i.e. in “absence of any form of coercion by the State or by 
agents or third parties that act with its authority or acquiescence.”50 It also pointed out that this meant that practices which 
attempted to “undermine the social cohesion of the affected communities, either through corruption of community leaders 
or by establishing parallel leaders, or through negotiations with individual members of the community that are contrary to 
international standards”,51 were incompatible with good faith requirements. Finally, it reminded the parties that “the 
obligation to consult is the responsibility of the State; therefore the planning and executing of the consultation process is 
not an obligation that can be avoided by delegating it to a private company or to third parties, much less delegating it to 
the same company that is interested in exploiting the resources in the territory of the community that is the subject of the 
consultation”.52 The IACtHR concluded that Ecuador violated rights recognized in the American Convention on Human 
Rights – particularly through violating the rights to consultation, to indigenous communal property and to cultural identity 
(Article 21 of the Convention), as the project directly affected the territory of the Kichwa – and ILO Convention 169. In 
addition, the Court recalled several times the UNDRIP as a source of applicable standards in the field, including as 
instrument “particularly relevant to the recognition of the right to cultural identity of indigenous peoples”.53 In light of its 
findings, the IACtHR ordered Ecuador to pay $1.4 million compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, and 
consult with the Sarayaku people on the removal of the remaining explosives on the territory of the Sarayaku as well as on 
any type of investment or development plan with potential repercussions for their territory or affect essential aspects of 
their worldview or life, integrity or cultural identity. Moreover, Ecuador was ordered to adopt legislative or other 
measures to give full effect to the right to prior consultation of indigenous peoples as well as make a public 
                                                 
 Senior Researcher, Department of European, International and Comparative Law, University of Wien (Austria). 
46 Reglamenta para la ejecución de la consulta previa libre e informada en los procesos de licitación y asignación de áreas y bloques 
hidrocarburíferos, 19 July 2012. 
47 CESCR, Concluding observations of the Committee on the third periodic report of Ecuador as approved by the Committee at its 
forty-ninth session (14-30 November 2012), 13 December 2012, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/ECU/CO/3 of 13 December 2012, para. 9. 
48 Burlington Resources Inc. v Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 June 2010. 
49 See Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador, Series C No. 245, Judgment of 27 June 2012. 
50 Ibid., para. 186. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., para. 187. 
53 Ibid., para. 215. 
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acknowledgement of its international responsibility. At the moment of this writing, the implementation by Ecuador of the 
Court’s judgment has only been partial, as the government has only paid compensation and issued an official apology, 
which is troubling in particular regarding the obligation to ensure with legislative or other measures that the international 
standard of the right to consultation is put into effect. Furthermore, to date the majority of the explosives have not been 
removed from the Sarayaku territories. 
 
The Sarayaku proceedings serve as yardsticks for the protection of indigenous rights in several aspects. In particular, the 
inclusive procedure exemplified in this case is certainly a promising example for future proceedings dealing with 
indigenous rights. On a substantive level, the IACtHR observations relating to the content of the consultation process, 
especially its detailing of the good faith requirement and its emphasis on clarifying that the obligation is a direct 
responsibility of the state which cannot be delegated to private parties interested in resource exploitation activities, are 
particularly noteworthy. This comes not only as a direct response to the facts at hand but as a general response to the 
common problems arising in the context of operationalizing the principle of free, prior and informed consultation/consent. 
 
The Decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights concerning the Awas Tingni vs. Nicaragua Case 
(2001): The Implementation Gap 
(by Felipe Gómez Isa) 
In August 2001, the IACtHR issued a landmark and pioneering decision in the field of indigenous peoples’ human rights 
law with the Awas Tingni judgment.54 As is well-known, the ruling of the IACtHR in this case soon gained the value of 
precedent in recognizing that the interpretation of the right to property established in Article 21 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights includes the communal forms of property of ancestral lands common among indigenous 
communities. However, while the huge significance of the judgment in point is undeniable, its implementation by the 
government of Nicaragua has been long and tortuous. 
 
As stated in the Court’s judgment, the State of Nicaragua had to “adopt the legislative, administrative, and any other 
measures required to create an effective mechanism for delimitation, demarcation, and titling of the property of 
indigenous communities, in accordance with their customary law, values, customs and mores”.55 In the specific case of 
the Awas Tingni community, the Court granted the State 15 months to “carry out the delimitation, demarcation, and titling 
of the corresponding lands of the members of the Awas Tingni Community […] with full participation by the Community 
and taking into account its customary law, values, customs and mores”.56 
 
There have been various stages in the implementation of the judgment in various respects. One of the main difficulties has 
concerned recognition, demarcation and titling of the land rights of the indigenous community. There have been a clear 
lack of resources and delays in the implementation process. The major progress occurred in December 2008, when – once 
the work of measuring and marking out the indigenous territory was successfully completed – the community was 
awarded the title to their ancestral lands and that title was registered. It was the Comisión Nacional de Demarcación y 
Titulación (CONADETI) which, pursuant to Law 445 (2003), issued the Communal Title Deed No. 007-13-12-2008 
relating to the AMASAU territory (Awas Tingni Mayangnina Sauni Umani) on 13 December 2008. 
 
However, the last stage of the process of demarcation and titling, involving the title clearance in relation to the third 
parties located within them, has proved particularly problematic. Title clearance was intended to identify and characterise 
the presence of third parties within indigenous territories in an attempt to reach a solution that was compatible with the 
exercise of the territorial rights by indigenous peoples, but the title clearance process was hampered by the lack of 
coordination between the institutions. As a consequence, the absolute lack of title clearance is paving the way to the 
invasion of the indigenous territories by settlers through violence, displacement and destruction of indigenous property. 
It is to be recognized that it is objectively difficult for a country like Nicaragua to properly implement a judgment like the 
one in discussion, especially when it leads to big changes (like the Awas Tingni judgment actually does). In any event, 
even if there are serious problems in implementing the judgment in point, it has nevertheless greatly empowered the 
indigenous community to defend its land rights. The very process leading to the Court’s judgment has represented an 
essential tool for the empowerment of the community. The judgment in itself was of paramount importance for a number 
of reasons: first, the evolutionary interpretation of the IACtHR in the Awas Tingni case set a very promising precedent for 
the evolution of the right of indigenous peoples to their lands and natural resources in international law, followed by the 
Court in its subsequent jurisprudence;57 secondly, it recognized the collective dimension of indigenous peoples’ land 
rights, as well as that “the close ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognised and understood as the 
                                                 
54 See Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, n. 29 above. 
55 Ibid., para. 164. 
56 Ibid. 
57 See n. 29 above. 
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fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity and their economic survival”;58 thirdly, the Court 
emphasized that the legal basis of indigenous peoples’ land rights is not grounded on the recognition by the State, but on 
the customary practices of indigenous communities; last but not least, in one stage of the implementation of the judgment 
– particularly in Recital III of the Communal Title Deed awarding communal title deed in favour of the Awas Tingni – the 
legal grounds used to argue the relevance for that title to be issued included a reference to the UNDRIP, in particular to 
the provisions concerning the right of indigenous peoples to their lands, territories and resources. In sum, despite the 
enormous difficulties that the Awas Tingni have faced in the implementation process of the IACtHR judgment, it must be 
acknowledged that the Court’s decision has paved the way for very progressive developments in terms of indigenous 
peoples’ rights to their lands and territories, and a degree of empowerment for the indigenous peoples themselves in 
defence of their rights. On the other hand, however, there is a huge gap between, on one side, the formal recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ rights and, on the other, the stark reality still faced every day as part of an unbridled struggle for 
access to natural resources. In this respect, it is to be noted, among other things, that the Inter-American human rights 
system should be improved especially through establishing some specific effective mechanisms to favour the 
implementation process of the IACtHR decisions. 
 
The Maya Communities in Belize 
(by Federico Lenzerini and Siegfried Wiessner)**** 
More than thirty villages belonging to Maya Communities are scattered throughout Southern Belize, connected with each 
other through gravel roads and forest trails. For more than twenty years the Maya in Belize have been fighting for 
preserving their traditional lands, after the government of Belize, in the mid-1990s, had granted logging concessions and 
oil exploration licences over parts of their lands in the Toledo District. In particular, in 1994, the government converted 
almost 42,000 acres of the Maya ancestral territory into government land, establishing the Sarstoon-Temash National Park 
(STNP), without consulting the community. The government subsequently opened the STNP to oil exploration and 
drilling by US Capital Energy Belize, Ltd, a wholly owned Belizean subsidiary of the American company US Capital 
Energy, Inc. Starting from 2004, the Maya Communities achieved a series of judicial victories in front of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights as well as of various national courts. This notwithstanding, the government of 
Belize continued to pursue its plans of economic exploitation in the areas where the Maya territories are located. For this 
reason, the Maya brought their case in front of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), where the community obtained 
another landmark victory. 
 
In 2004 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that the government of Belize – by granting logging and 
oil concessions in the Maya lands and otherwise failing to adequately protect them and to recognize and secure the 
territorial rights of the Maya people in those lands, as well as by failing to afford the Maya people judicial protection of 
their rights and interests in the lands – violated a number of provisions of the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man.59 In particular, the said behaviour violated the right to property enshrined in Article XXIII, the right to 
equality before the law, to equal protection of the law, and to non-discrimination provided for by Article II, as well as the 
right to judicial protection enshrined in Article XVIII of the Declaration.60 The Commission consequently ordered the 
government of Belize to adopt “in its domestic law, and through fully informed consultations with the Maya people, the 
legislative, administrative, and any other measures necessary to delimit, demarcate and title or otherwise clarify and 
protect the territory in which the Maya people have a communal property right, in accordance with their customary land 
use practices, and without detriment to other indigenous communities”; to carry out “the measures to delimit, demarcate 
and title or otherwise clarify and protect the corresponding lands of the Maya people without detriment to other 
indigenous communities”; and to repair “the environmental damage resulting from the logging concessions granted by the 
State in respect of the territory traditionally occupied and used by the Maya people”.61 
 
In 2007, in a landmark judgment in the consolidated cases of Aurelio Cal et al. v. Belize, the Supreme Court of Belize 
ordered the government of Belize to officially declare that the claimant Maya villages and their members hold, 
respectively, “collective and individual rights in the lands and resources that they have used and occupied according to 
Maya customary practices and that these rights constitute ‘property’ within the meaning of […] the Belize Constitution”, 
as well as that the boundaries of the said lands are those “established through Maya customary practices”. In addition, the 
Court ordered the government to demarcate the lands concerned and provide official documentation of Maya property 
title, as well as to defend the community from external interferences – either by agents of the government itself or third 
                                                 
58 See Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, n. 29 above, para. 149. 
**** The authors gratefully acknowledge Mr. José David Quiñones Villegas, from Colombia, LL.M. University of Siena (Italy), for his 
valuable help in the research for this case-study. 
59 The text of the Declaration is available at <https://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.American%20Declaration.htm> 
(accessed 26 May 2016). 
60 See Report Nº 40/04, Case 12.053, Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, 12 October 2004, available at 
<http://www.law2.arizona.edu/depts/iplp/outreach/maya_belize/documents/BelizeFinalRpt.pdf> (accessed 26 May 2016), para. 192 ff. 
61 Ibid., para. 197. 
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parties – threatening their property rights.62 The Chief Justice, in elaborating on his finding of a violation of customary 
international law, stated that the UNDRIP, “embodying as it does, general principles of international law relating to 
indigenous peoples and their lands and resources, is of such force that the defendants, representing the Government of 
Belize, will not disregard it”. “The United Nations, its bodies and specialized agencies including at the country level, and 
states, are enjoined to promote respect for and full application of the Declaration’s provision and to follow up its 
effectiveness”.63 The Supreme Court ruled in favour of Maya communities again in 2010,64 and, in 2014, finally affirmed 
that the decision of the government of Belize to allow oil drilling and road construction in the STNP was irrational and 
unreasonable, “that decision having been made without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous Maya 
communities”. In addition, it held that the government has an obligation under the UNDRIP “to respect the rights of the 
Indigenous Maya Peoples to their lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or 
otherwise used or acquired”.65 In the meantime, in 2013, the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court 
that Maya customary land tenure existed in all Maya villages in the Toledo District of southern Belize, as well as that it 
constituted property within the meaning of the Constitution of Belize. However, the Court of Appeal also held that there 
had been no violation of any constitutional guarantees by the government and, consequently, that the issue of 
constitutional relief did not arise.66 For this reason, the Maya brought their case before the CCJ. 
 
The Caribbean Court released its judgment on 30 October 2015.67 The Court assessed the issue of damages for breach of 
the Maya community constitutional rights under three separate heads: (1) protection against arbitrary deprivation of 
property; (2) right to equality and non-discrimination; and (3) right to protection of the law. The CCJ failed to find a 
breach of the right to the protection against arbitrary deprivation of property under the Constitution of Belize, because the 
nature of the Appellants’ property rights and the entitlement flowing therefrom are yet to be precisely defined. The Court 
also dismissed the equality and non-discrimination claim, on the basis that there was no evidence of discriminatory 
treatment of the Appellants based on race or ethnicity. However, the Court held that the Maya community right to the 
protection of the law had been breached, due to “the failure of the Government of Belize to recognize and protect Maya 
customary land tenure rights”.68 In this respect, the Court noted that “the right to protection of the law encompasses the 
international obligations of the State to recognize and protect the rights of indigenous people. A recognized sub-set of the 
rule of law is the obligation of the State to honour its international commitments”.69 The Court added that “[i]t is beyond 
dispute that international law recognizes and protects the rights of indigenous peoples”,70 and, referring to the UNDRIP 
specifically, emphasized that, while it is not binding in itself, it is “relevant to the interpretation of the Constitution of 
Belize which in its preamble explicitly recognizes that state policies must protect the culture and identity of its indigenous 
peoples but also must promote respect for international law and treaty obligations”.71 In conclusion, the CCJ resolved that 
the decision of the Court of Appeal on the issue of damages be reversed, and that the Maya community be awarded moral 
damages for violations of their right to maintain their customary land tenure. It consequently ordered the Government of 
Belize to establish a fund of BZ$300,000.00 as a first step towards compliance with its undertaking to protect Maya 
customary land tenure, as well as to pay 75% of the appellants’ costs.   
 
The decision of the CCJ reinforces the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights to their traditional lands under their 
customary land tenure systems, as well as the right to moral damages, i.e. reparations for violations, serving as key 
example of the implementation of international collective rights of indigenous peoples in municipal law, in this case on 
the level of constitutional law. 
 
                                                 
62 See Claims 171 and 172 of 2007, Aurelio Cal et al v. Attorney General of Belize, 18 October 2007, available at 
<http://www.law2.arizona.edu/depts/iplp/outreach/maya_belize/documents/ClaimsNos171and172of2007.pdf> (accessed 26 May 
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International Law – The Maya Cases in the Supreme Court of Belize”, in F. Lenzerini (ed.), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples. 
International and Comparative Perspectives, Oxford, 2008, p. 567. 
63 Ibid., para. 132. 
64 See Claim No. 366 of 2008, The Maya Leaders Alliance et Al. v. The Attorney General of Belize et Al., 28 June 2010, available at 
<http://www.law2.arizona.edu/depts/iplp/outreach/maya_belize/documents/Claim%20366%20of%202008.pdf> (accessed 26 May 
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Indigenous Rights and Extractivism in Argentina 
(by Marzia Rosti) 
The second half of the 20th century has represented perhaps the most important, long-awaited moment for the indigenous 
peoples in Argentina, because the country aligned itself with the policies adopted by the other Latin American countries in 
relation to indigenous rights during the same period. In particular, new Article 75.17 of the Constitution, introduced in 
1994, lists a large catalogue of indigenous rights, including the right to collective ownership of the lands traditionally 
occupied, participation in managing the natural resources present in those territories and the right to a bilingual and 
intercultural education. This provision is supplemented by some very significant legislative acts increasing the level of 
protection of indigenous peoples’ rights in the country. Argentina ratified ILO 169 Convention in 200072, and the 
government voted in favour of the UNDRIP on the day of its adoption by the U.N. General Assembly, on 13 September 
2007. 
 
As just noted, in Argentina land rights of indigenous peoples are constitutionally protected. However, the increase in 
territorial claims stimulated a number of initiatives at the provincial level to regulate possession of the land, which on 
their turn led to the development of a case law in the context of which, while the courts sometimes ruled in favour of the 
indigenous communities, they proved to be quite reluctant to acknowledge that the fact of being indigenous entitled 
indigenous communities to specific rights. In addition, the profound political, economic and social crisis experienced by 
the country during 2001-2002 led the government, in order to revive the country, to promote the production and export of 
agricultural products and the exploitation of natural resources, in particular gas and crude oil, first of all to satisfy the 
domestic energy requirements. The success of the modelo extractivista allowed the penetration of extractive activities into 
areas of the country which had previously remained excluded or almost excluded from exploitation projects, including 
traditional territories of indigenous communities, with a resulting increase in tensions, which frequently degenerated into 
episodes of violence. This led to the evacuation of many indigenous communities from their traditional lands and allowed 
“extraction industries” to have access into indigenous territories, with the complicity of political institutions, while 
movements of protest by indigenous peoples were criminalized. On the other hand, however, some of the controversies 
triggered by this situation have led to the victory of the indigenous communities concerned and to recognition of their 
land rights by domestic courts. It is the case, for example, of the dispute between the Wenctru Trawel Leufu Community 
and the Empresa Petrolera Piedra de Aguila, concerning a license granted to the latter to perform exploration activities 
and to exploit the hydrocarbon resources in the area inhabited by the community. Indeed, in 2011, a local court ordered 
the operations in the indigenous territory to be suspended. This decision was confirmed on 6 December 2012 by the 
Tribunal Superior de Justicia di Neuquén, which rejected the appeal submitted by the oil company and by the Fiscalía de 
Estado and acknowledged the existence of the indigenous settlement and, therefore, the obligation to respect indigenous 
rights. 
 
In conclusion, it is to be noted that in Argentina, in some cases, the complicity among the national or local institutions and 
the extraction companies has led to a denial of indigenous peoples’ land rights, in violation of both national legislation 
and pertinent international standards. In other cases, however, national courts have followed the opposite approach, ruling 
in favour of indigenous rights. This recently happened, for instance, with a judgment by the Corte Suprema de Justicia de 
la Nación (CSJN), issued on 10 November 2015, which upheld the Recurso Extraordinario Federal submitted by the Las 
Huaytekas community of Río Negro against the precautionary measure that ordered the evacuation from its territory and 
recognized the evidentiary value of the “relevamiento técnico-jurídico-catastral”, in line with Article 14.2 of ILO 
Convention 169, establishing that governments “shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples 
concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession”. It is to 
be hoped that in the near future the attention recently shown by courts with regard to indigenous peoples’ land rights will 
consolidate, as well as that the government will be able to reconcile the objectives of economic growth with its 
international obligations regarding indigenous peoples. 
 
The Implementation of IACtHR Judgments Concerning Land Rights in Suriname: Saramaka People V. Suriname 
and Subsequent Cases 
(by Anna Meijknecht, Bas Rombouts and Jacintha Asarfi) 
In recent years, the IACtHR has issued two very significant judgments concerning indigenous and tribal peoples’ land 
rights in Suriname. 
First, in the leading Saramaka case,73 the IACtHR reaffirmed the right to communal property under Article 21 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights for tribal peoples, by stating that “the Court`s jurisprudence regarding indigenous 
people’s right to property is also applicable to tribal peoples because both share distinct, social, cultural, and economic 
                                                 
 Professor of History of Latin America, University of Milano (Italy). 
72 See n. 22 above. 
 PhD Student, Tilburg Law School (The Netherlands). 
73 See Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, n. 29 above. 
14 
 
characteristics, including a special relationship with their ancestral territories, that require special measures under 
international human rights law in order to guarantee their physical and cultural survival”.74 The Court, taking into account 
Article 32 UNDRIP, significantly added that, “[r]egarding large-scale development or investment projects that would 
have a major impact within Saramaka territory, the State has a duty, not only to consult with the Saramakas, but also to 
obtain their free, prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and traditions”.75 The Court concluded that 
Suriname had violated the property rights of the members of the Saramaka people recognized in Article 21 of the 
Convention and ordered the respondent government to delimit, demarcate and grant the community collective title over 
the territory in accordance with their customary laws, and through previous, effective and fully informed consultations 
with the Saramaka people, as well as to ensure the full exercise and enjoyment of their right to communal property 
through adopting all the necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to this end.76 Additionally, the Court 
ordered the State to take measures of satisfaction, such as translating the judgment in Dutch and publishing it in the 
State’s Official Gazette and one daily newspaper as well as financing the broadcasts of several paragraphs in the 
Saramaka language. The material and immaterial damages were also awarded, through, respectively, granting a 
compensation of US$ 75.000,00 and allocating US$ 600.000,00 for a community development fund.77 
 
The second case at issue concerned the Kaliña and Lokono people.78 In its judgment, released in November 2015, the 
IACtHR followed the same reasoning of the Saramaka judgment, by declaring that the State has to grant the Kaliña and 
Lokono peoples legal recognition of collective juridical personality, delimit and demarcate the traditional territory of the 
members of the communities concerned, grant them collective title to that territory and ensure their effective use and 
enjoyment thereof, as well as create a community development fund to their benefit.79 
 
Finally, another similar case is at present pending before the Court. It concerns the Kaliña indigenous community of 
Maho and the Association of Indigenous Village Leaders in Suriname, who filed a complaint to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights on 16 December 2009, claiming that the government of Suriname has granted concessions 
and permits to third parties to allow them to exploit the land, territory and natural resources traditionally occupied and 
used by the community.80 The petition was declared admissible by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on 
19 March 2013. 
 
So far, a number of obstacles have hampered the full implementation by Suriname of the Saramaka judgment. 
Considering the innovative character of the Courts’ rulings concerning indigenous land rights, it is plausible that their 
practical implementation on national level takes some time. However, almost ten years have passed since the Saramaka 
judgment and the government of Suriname has still not managed to fully implement any of the substantive parts of the 
ruling. Among other things, it has been unable to provide the legislative basis for recognising and securing indigenous and 
tribal rights in Suriname, notwithstanding international expertise offered by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, several detailed monitoring compliance reports by the IACHR, involvement of the CERD Committee 
and other States and even the submission to the State for its consideration of several draft laws on indigenous and 
peoples’ rights drafted by indigenous and tribal peoples and their organisations. The ongoing lack of full compliance with 
the Courts’ ruling affects the physical and cultural survival of the Saramaka indigenous communities, as well as the 
environment and natural resources in the areas concerned. Moreover, it undermines the trustworthiness of the State and 
creates repetitive cases – the case of the Kaliña and Lokono people and the Maho Indigenous Community case. All three 
cases reveal a structural problem involving a lack of recognition in domestic law of the juridical personality and right to 
collective property of indigenous and tribal peoples in Suriname. Furthermore, they reveal the lack of strong compliance 
mechanisms within the Organization of American States system; indeed, in case of failure to comply with the IACtHR 
judgments in contentious cases of breach of the American Convention on Human Rights or the Court’s order of 
provisional measures, there are no effective tools to enforce sanctions.   
 
A positive development, though, seems to be a growing alertness within the government that the development of measures 
necessary to implement the judgments will have to be done in dialogue with the people concerned. This development can 
be discerned, for instance, by the fact that the State and the Maho Indigenous Community are in the process of a friendly 
settlement and that the State of Suriname has communicated to the Inter-American Commission that it is in favour of 
finding a solution for the land rights issues and to hold a dialogue with the Maho Indigenous Community.  
 
The Case of the Hydroelectric Plant of Belo Monte in Brazil 
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(by Rafael Soares Leite) 
Belo Monte is a hydroelectric plant, qualified as a mega structure project that has been built in the Xingu River in the 
Amazon in the state of Pará. The plant was planned as an expansion of Brazilian energy matrix, which is highly 
dependent on hydropower. Since the very beginning of the construction of the plant, it has been subject to criticism by 
both environmentalists and traditional communities that live off the surrounding natural resources. Even though the 
implementation of the dam project is well advanced, its completion is expected in 2019. The environmental impact studies 
date from 2007, and the granting of the concession occurred in 2010. In terms of development for the country, it is 
estimated that the plant, with the installed capacity of 11.233,1 megawatts, will be able to supply energy for 60 million 
people, or approximately 18 million households. 
 
At present, there are many lawsuits being considered that are related to the implementation of the hydroelectric dam. In 
addition to indigenous disputes and conflicts of an environmental kind, there have recently been allegations of fraud and 
corruption involving parties that support the government, linking those crimes to the Belo Monte concession. In 
particular, the failure to implement the necessary conditions for ensuring appropriate protection of the traditional lands of 
the communities concerned has threatened the very survival of the indigenous peoples affected by the project. 
Furthermore, a licence has been issued for the Belo Sun gold mining project in close proximity to the Belo Monte dam, in 
the absence of consultation and the lack of a cumulative assessment of environmental, social and human rights impacts on 
indigenous peoples. 
 
The case is now under international scrutiny by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. On 1 April 2011 the 
IACHR granted precautionary measures in favor of the indigenous communities of the Xingu River basin, with the 
purpose of safeguarding the life and personal integrity of those people, affected by the construction of the Belo Monte 
hydroelectric plant.81 The Commission suggested many provisional measures to the Brazilian government, including the 
suspension of works related to Belo Monte. The Brazilian government did not receive well this decision, and reacted by 
adopting severe diplomatic measures. The case is still pending. 
 
In addition to the Inter-American Commission, the case is under scrutiny by domestic courts. There are many lawsuits 
related to the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam construction, and one of the most important is registered under n. 
2006.39.03.000711-8/PA. In this case, the object of litigation is about the observance of the obligation to consult the 
affected indigenous communities before the deliberation by the Brazilian state about the concession and construction of 
the hydroelectric plant. The Federal Public Prosecution Body, as a plaintiff in the case, required the discontinuation of the 
construction of the plant as long as the indigenous communities are not consulted. It also disputed the legal validity of the 
Legislative Decree n. 788/2005, which authorized the federal government to implement the water use of Belo Monte in 
the Xingu river, since it was approved without consulting with the communities and without carrying out environmental 
impact studies. 
 
Important background for this case is the leading case of the demarcation of Raposa-Serra do Sol.82 Even though the 
Brazilian Constitution was enacted in 1988, it took almost twenty years for the Supreme Court to pronounce a judgment 
that would develop relevant standards for the interpretation of indigenous peoples’ constitutional rights. The case of the 
demarcation of Raposa-Serra do Sol gave rise to a controversial decision, in so far that, while recognizing the importance 
of indigenous peoples’ rights, the judgment seemed to subordinate such rights to other interests. For example, the 
Supreme Court held that, in the case of an indigenous land that is also a natural protected area, the federal environmental 
agency is responsible for the administration of the land.  
 
The Case of the Hydroelectric Plant of São Luiz do Tapajós in Brazil 
(by Rafael Soares Leite) 
The Tapajós hydroelectric project relates to the government’s intention to build a dam in a river located in the Tapajós 
basin, in Brazil. The project is still on paper and the execution has not started yet. When the Munduruku – the indigenous 
people living in the concerned area – learned about the government’s movements, they started mobilizing to ensure that 
ILO Convention 169 and the Federal Constitution be respected, especially the provisions related to participatory rights. 
The hydroelectric plant of the São Luiz do Tapajós is supposed to produce up to 8,000 megawatts with the flooding of a 
total area of 729 square kilometers after the construction of the reservoir. Besides the legal requirements from the 
perspective of indigenous peoples’ rights, there are also some legal procedures required by environmental law. Mainly, 
for the construction of the dam, it is also necessary for the project to obtain the environmental permit. 
 
From the indigenous point of view, the flooded area would extend to 17,000 hectares of the indigenous territory Sawré 
Muybu, attributed to the Munduruku people. It must be noted that this area has not been demarcated yet, an element 
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which distinguishes this case from the one of Belo Monte. The lack of consultation and the absence of demarcation of 
indigenous lands impacted by the Tapajos dam complex has been noted in the End of Mission Statement of 17 March 
2016 by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, Victoria Tauli Corpuz, on her visit to 
Brazil.83 
 
What makes the Tapajós case unique is the active participation of the indigenous peoples through two distinct but 
interrelated instruments: the so called “self-demarcation of land” and the consultation protocol. The self-demarcation of 
indigenous land Sawré Muybu was proposed by the Munduruku after government delay in the official demarcation. This 
delay is seen with suspicion by the Munduruku, since the recognized area would be flooded if the hydroelectric plant of 
São Luiz do Tapajós is implemented. This raises a very important question: what do the Munduruku people expect to 
achieve with the self-demarcation and how does it impact official decision making about the São Luiz do Tapajós? 
Another initiative attributed to the Tapajós case is the formulation of a “consultation protocol”, determining the terms 
according to which, how and when the Munduruku should be consulted. This is also of fundamental relevance in 
understanding the implementation of indigenous peoples’ rights, since this was supposedly based on ILO Convention 169 
and affects the economic rights of the Munduruku. 
 
Like for the case of the hydroelectric plant of Belo Monte, the leading case of the demarcation of Raposa-Serra do Sol84 
represents an important background for the São Luiz do Tapajós case as well. 
 
NORTHERN AMERICA 
 
Glamis Gold Ltd. (Claimant) v United States of America (Respondent), NAFTA/UNCITRAL Award, 8 June 2009 
(by Christina Binder, with the contribution of Jane A. Hofbauer) 
The Glamis Gold award (2009)85 is one of the recent investment awards touching upon indigenous rights and may be 
considered a symbolic example of the clash between investors’ rights and cultural heritage protection. This award is 
particularly concerned with the question how regulatory measures aimed at the protection of cultural indigenous sites can 
be classified from an investor‘s perspective, and whether such measures amount to a breach of standards of treatment 
enshrined in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
 
Glamis Gold, a Canadian mining company, was engaged in gold mining operations from 1988 in southeastern California, 
in an area of the Californian desert near to Native American lands and areas where the Quechan Indian Nation’s tribe has 
a special cultural concern.86 The mining site was located within the California Desert Conservation Area (CDCA), an area 
governed by three principles, i.e. multiple use, sustainable yield and the maintenance of environmental quality.87 In 
application of these principles a balance is to be achieved between the competing interests of the investor with “other 
potential uses for the land and the need to protect federal resources”.88 In this context, the CDCA Plan foresees that 
cultural resources are to “be given the same consideration as other resource values”.89 The Tribunal addressed Glamis 
Gold’s claims for expropriation under Article 1110 NAFTA and fair and equitable treatment (FET) under Article 1105 
NAFTA in turn. In the end, it dismissed both claims. In particular, with respect to the FET issue, the Tribunal noted that a 
change by the government of a decades-old rule grounded on a danger of a “significant, unavoidable adverse impact to 
cultural resources and Native American sacred sites”90 was not contrary to the principle of fair and equitable treatment. 
The proceedings were marked by a comparatively strong involvement of the affected community, the Quechan tribe, 
through the filing of two non-party submissions. In addition, the Quechan tribe was allowed to watch the proceedings 
from a different location with a separate video feed which was not interrupted when the otherwise restricted discussion on 
the cultural sites and artefacts was taking place. A strong focus of their submissions focused on the question whether 
Glamis Gold’s investment and the regulatory measures taken in response by the United States, were consistent with 
indigenous rights, i.e. “wider public international law”, which they argued was part of the applicable law to be considered 
by the Tribunal established under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules. At the same time, the award by the NAFTA Tribunal 
paid surprisingly little attention to the submissions by the Quechan tribe and to the role of indigenous interests in the 
context of foreign investments proceedings. Not only did it point this out explicitly in the opening passages of the award, 
but it is also evident in its analysis of the substantive arguments of the parties. Thus, the Tribunal repeatedly emphasized 
that, in light of the balancing exercise states must conduct when dealing with competing interests, its role was limited to 
subsidiary determination whether these measures were, e.g., a gross or “manifestly arbitrary” denial of justice. Hence, 
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even though the award was, in result, favorable to the Quechan tribe’s rights, indigenous rights and concerns played little 
to no role for the Tribunal’s decision. 
 
 
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia (Canada) 
(by Nicole Schabus and René Kuppe) 
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia91 was decided by the Canadian Supreme Court on 26 June 2014. It must be 
considered as a landmark decision concerning indigenous land and resource rights, within a Common Law legal 
framework. It is a historic decision in that it resulted in the first affirmation of Aboriginal Title in Canada. The case 
history goes back to the year 1983, when the Canadian province of British Columbia granted a logging permit in a 
territory claimed by the indigenous Tsilhqot’in people, living in the Interior of the province of British Columbia. The 
Tsilhqot’in had resisted the decision of the province through blockades and negotiations, and finally filed an action, 
seeking a declaration of Aboriginal title based on the constitutional protection for Aboriginal Rights provided under 
subsection 35 (1) of the Canadian Constitution Act (1982), stating that “(t)he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed”. Aboriginal title is a doctrine developed in Common 
Law countries by jurisprudence, stating that indigenous tenure by Aboriginal Peoples has persisted the assumption of 
sovereignty by the British colonial empire, which in itself is a problematic concept. In Canada, one of the sources of 
Aboriginal title is exclusive occupation at the time of assertion of sovereignty, which for British Columbia has been set 
for 1846 with the Oregon Boundary Treaty. The Canadian Supreme Court set out the following principles for the proof of 
Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia: “(i) the land must have been occupied prior to sovereignty, (ii) if 
present occupation is relied on as proof of occupation pre-sovereignty, there must be a continuity between present and 
pre-sovereignty occupation, and (iii) at sovereignty, that occupation must have been exclusive”.92 
 
The full application of the test was to be determined in the Tsilhqot’in case whose claim referred to an area in the core of 
Tsilhqot’in territory of approximately 4,300 square kilometers. British Columbia Supreme Court trial judge Justice 
Vickers accepted a territorial concept of Aboriginal Title, but he rejected the arguments by the province of British 
Columbia and the federal government urging a site specific approach, where only specific intensively used sites such as 
villages could be subject to Aboriginal Title, as a “postage stamp approach” that was inconsistent with Canadian 
constitutional law and for that matter international law. Yet that was the very approach that the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal adopted relying on the rejected “cultural security approach”, suggesting that indigenous peoples could maintain 
their culture solely through recognition of Aboriginal use rights, such as hunting and fishing, throughout the territory, 
while declarations of title would be limited to small site specific areas such as villages, preferably fenced areas and 
extensively and proactively used areas, such as “salt licks and buffalo jumps”. This approach was unanimously and 
soundly rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada, which stated that “[t]here is no suggestion in the jurisprudence or 
scholarship that Aboriginal title is confined to specific village sites or farms, as the Court of Appeal held.  Rather, a 
culturally sensitive approach suggests that regular use of territories for hunting, fishing, trapping and foraging is 
“sufficient” use to ground Aboriginal title […]”.93 The Supreme Court hence reverted to a territorial concept of 
Aboriginal Title, arguably going beyond its own previous decisions on that regard. It issued a declaration of Aboriginal 
Title to a contiguous area of about 1,750 square kilometers that the Tsilhqot’in had historically used and occupied. 
Aboriginal Rights to hunt, fish and trap had already been accepted in a legally binding manner, for the entire claim area, 
by courts. The legally binding declaration of Title is actually contained in a map prepared by the trial judge together with 
a cartographer, using elevations on the plateau, rivers including the spawning grounds for the Chilko salmon run, and 
other natural features to demarcate the area.  
 
The importance of the Supreme Court of Canada issuing the first declaration of Aboriginal Title in Canadian history 
cannot be overstated. In previous cases, such as Delgamuukw, while upholding the concept of Aboriginal Title, no legal 
remedy had been granted and the case was sent back to trial. While the Supreme Court in its decision does not explicitly 
refer to international law, a number of the indigenous interveners made reference to international legal standards, such as 
the right to self-determination and other specific indigenous peoples’ rights. They also included references to Canada’s 
policy of not recognizing indigenous land rights being criticized by international human rights bodies, including by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, that Canada lacked effective national remedies in regard to the 
recognition of indigenous land rights, both in the courts and negotiations, in regard to the Hul’qumi’num Nation,94 who 
also intervened in this case before the Supreme Court of Canada. Together, indigenous peoples made it clear that, if they 
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were to be once again denied a remedy, they would take the case before international bodies and this clearly weighed 
heavily on the Supreme Court of Canada issuing a declaration of title. 
 
The judgment in point also has important implications for a correct understanding of the definition of indigenous rights 
over land. It strengthens the view that the geographical extent of indigenous land rights must be defined according to 
traditional patterns of land and resource use, and must not limit indigenous land rights to areas under intense occupation. 
This should be an important understanding of the land rights articles included in the UNDRIP, Article 26(2) of which 
states that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that 
they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have 
otherwise acquired”. The Tsilhqot’in decision is an important step to show that “traditional occupation or use” should not 
be defined by a reference to a western understanding of intense land use, but recognize and protect indigenous patterns of 
stewardship over and use of lands. 
 
The Onondaga Nation and The Haudenosaunee against The United States 
(by Joseph J. Heath, Esq., Onondaga Nation General Counsel) 
This case study concerns the Onondaga Nation’s Land Rights Action, which was summarily dismissed in the federal 
courts of the United States and the actual, practical problems which the Nation has experienced in gaining any true justice 
for loss of human rights. The Onondaga Nation is a sovereign Indigenous nation whose original homelands are situated in 
what is now central New York State, in the United States. The Nation seeks redress for the violation of the human rights 
of the Onondaga people to their lands, to equal treatment, and to judicial protection. The Nation and its people have a 
unique spiritual, cultural and historic relationship with the land, which is embodied in the Gayanashagowa, the Great Law 
of Peace. 
 
The Haudenosaunee Six Nations, including the Onondaga Nation, entered into three treaties with the United States: the 
1784 Treaty of Ft. Stanwix, the 1789 Treaty of Ft. Harmer and the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua. In these treaties, the 
United States affirmed the sovereignty of the Nation, promised to protect Nation lands, and guaranteed the Nation the 
“free use and enjoyment” of its territory. Between 1788 and 1822, the State of New York took approximately 2.5 million 
acres of Onondaga Nation land in violation of federal law and treaties and in violation of the Nation’s own law. Today, 
despite these treaty and statutory guarantees, the Onondaga Nation is in possession of only a small fraction of its legally-
protected, original territory. The land currently acknowledged as Onondaga territory under federal law comprises 
approximately 6,900 acres. The courts of the United States have failed to provide any remedy for this loss of land. The 
Nation asserted its case at three levels of the federal judicial system: U.S. District Court, the Court of Appeals and the 
U.S. Supreme Court. The Nation was denied relief at each stage. The federal courts uniformly ruled that they are 
powerless to provide any remedy. As a result, the loss of Nation lands at the hands of New York State cannot be redressed 
in the U.S. judicial system. On 29 March 2005, about three weeks after the filing of the Nation’s Complaint, the United 
States Supreme Court ruled, in City of Sherrill vs. Oneida Indian Nation,95 that the doctrines of “laches, impossibility and 
acquiescence” precluded the Oneida Nation from asserting immunity from real property taxes on treaty protected, 
reservation land that had been taken by the State of New York in 1795 but subsequently purchased by the Oneidas in the 
1990s. Oral argument on the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was heard by U.S. District Court Judge Kahn, in Albany, 
New York, on 11 October 2007. Decision was reserved at that time. On 5 August 2010, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals dismissed another Indian land claim based on violations of the Trade and Intercourse Act.96 On 22 September 
2010, Judge Kahn issued a Memorandum Decision and Order that granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss and 
ordered the dismissal of the Nation’s Complaint in its entirety, thereby foreclosing the possibility of any judicial relief for 
New York State’s violations of the treaties and federal law. Oral argument was held before a three-judge panel of the 
court in New York City on 12 October 2012. One week later, on 19 October 2012, the Court of Appeals issued a two page 
Summary Order and Judgment affirming the District Court’s dismissal of the Nation’s complaint.97 In 2013, the Nation’s 
Land Rights Action was summarily dismissed by the federal courts of the United States. Subsequently, on 15 April 2014, 
the Nation filed a Petition against the United States before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.98 
 
The loss of control over and access to their traditional hunting, gathering and fishing areas at the hands of the State of 
New York has deprived the Onondaga people of food and other materials essential to their health and welfare. As a result, 
the loss of their lands has significantly degraded the health of the Onondaga people; and the loss of their lands has been 
profoundly disruptive to the Nation’s citizens and their health. The loss of Onondaga original territory has also weakened 
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and in some cases severed the Nation’s cultural and spiritual ties to Onondaga sacred sites, such as Onondaga Lake, the 
glacial, kettle lakes in the region of Tully, New York and many others. 
 
The United States domestic legal system’s denial of a remedy for breach of the Nation’s land rights and treaties is a 
violation of the Nation’s fundamental human rights protected by the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of 
Man, the UNDRIP and other rules of customary international and treaty law. In addition, the illegal dispossession of the 
Nation’s lands was in clear violation of the above mentioned bilateral treaties between the United States and the 
Haudenosaunee Six Nations, the United States Constitution and federal laws of the United States. There is no 
international forum that has the jurisdiction to enforce any human rights decision against the United States. Additionally, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is so severely underfunded and understaffed that cases take far too 
long for any adjudication or decision. Once a decision is eventually released by the Commission, the United States can 
simply ignore it, as it has done in other cases won by Indigenous nations. So, the practical result is that no relief is 
available for the violation of human rights of Indigenous nations by the United States. 
 
The Onondaga Nation recommends that the United States government recognizes the Nation’s land rights and fully 
comply with relevant international legal standards (especially the UNDRIP), removes the doctrine of discovery from its 
legal jurisprudence, reaches an agreement with the Nation, through discussion with the Nation’s leaders and the Nation’s 
chosen representative, on mechanisms by which the United States can fulfill its treaty obligations to the Nation and 
remedy the violations of the Nation’s rights. To the latter end, the government should establish an independent 
commission to study the violation of treaties between the United States and Indian nations and the subsequent disruption 
of Indigenous cultures, economies and governments by the United States, as well as adopt any legislative, administrative 
or other mechanisms to ensure the protection of the Nation’s rights. 
 
Fate Control and Human Rights: Local Governance in America’s Arctic 
(by Mara Kimmel) 
This case study focuses on land ownership and, more importantly, governance rights of Alaska Native peoples. The extent 
of sovereign rights to self-government is the result of federal and Alaskan state legislation and the decisions of the court 
systems, and it is continually evolving. While the Alaska Constitution’s text endorses local governance,99 its practices do 
not. Alaska’s policies of local self-government stand in stark contrast to the lack of authority given to tribal governments. 
While the urban system of governance is relatively simple, the corresponding rural system is very complex. This 
“complex non-system” of governance in the rural areas of Alaska creates tremendous obstacles for tribal governments 
when measured against similarly situated local governments in urban Alaska. The impacts of this disparity are magnified 
by the unwillingness of the State of Alaska to work with tribal governments. On multiple occasions, for example, the 
State has litigated against Alaska Native tribes to prevent their exercise of certain aspects of local self-government.100 
The legislation that aimed to settle aboriginal land claims by Alaska Natives – Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 
1971 (ANCSA) – was rooted in promoting economic opportunities for Alaska Natives and created for profit regional and 
village corporations to effectuate that goal. One outcome of this land claims settlement, however, was to sever tribal 
jurisdiction over traditional lands, leading to a situation where they do cannot govern their own territory. The legal 
solution in ANCSA and other Alaska specific laws and regulations prevents tribal governments from exercising the same 
sovereign rights over their territory as other indigenous communities, and is thus distinctly different from the self-
governance rights other indigenous tribes enjoy in the rest of the United States. To remedy this gap in self-governance, 
Alaska Natives are attempting to reassert their territorial governance rights via litigation and innovative co-management 
initiatives. The success of these outcomes has yet to be realized, and depends in large part on the application of legal 
principles of internal self-governance powers inherent to all indigenous peoples to Alaska Natives. 
 
Two approaches to remedying the loss of governance are advanced: expanding “Indian Country” to support territoriality, 
and amending federal law to provide for co-management of federal resources by tribes. With respect to the first approach, 
in May of 2014 the Department of Interior issued a draft regulation allowing Alaskan lands to be returned to trust status, 
recasting them as “Indian country” capable of supporting tribal governance.101 As for the second approach, it would 
consist in amending the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), through the Alaska Native 
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Subsistence Co-Management Demonstration Act of 2014 bill.102 This bill proposes a new co-management structure for the 
Ahtna region in Interior Alaska. It would amend ANILCA to provide for co-management on traditional lands within this 
specific region, integrating tribal governance and doing away with the dual system of management currently in place. 
To a notable extent, however, successful application of self-governance relies on the willingness of the U.S. and Alaska 
governments to cooperate and acknowledge those rights. In particular, State support should be accorded to rural 
governments, including tribal governments, to the same degree as in urban communities. Such support would enhance the 
capacity of tribal governments to adopt policies that promote human development and fate control. 
 
ASIA 
 
From Declaration to Implementation: The experience of the Subanon in the Philippines with the 
Operationalization of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(by Cathal M. Doyle) 
In 1997 the Philippines Congress passed the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).103 This landmark law was heavily 
inspired by the then draft UNDRIP, effectively incorporating the Declaration’s key provisions regarding the recognition 
of indigenous peoples’ territorial, cultural and self-determination rights into the national legislative framework. Among 
other things, the IPRA affirms the right of indigenous peoples “to use their own commonly accepted justice systems, 
conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices within 
their respective communities and as may be compatible with the national legal system and with internationally recognized 
human rights”.104 The IPRA also established a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), responsible for the 
“formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to recognize, protect and promote the rights and well-
being of [indigenous peoples with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions] and the recognition of 
their ancestral domains as well as the rights thereto”.105 The Act affirms that customary law has primacy within ancestral 
domains in the context of dispute resolution, with the NCIP serving as an appeal mechanism. This requirement is 
consistent with the UNDRIP’s recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights to self-determination and autonomy, to maintain 
and strengthen their political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions and to promote, develop and maintain their 
own juridical systems or customs.106  
 
Also in 1997, the CERD Committee issued its General Recommendation No. XXIII on Indigenous Peoples107 – a 
document which served to strengthen indigenous peoples’ position in negotiations with States on the UNDRIP and would 
become a key touchstone for State recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights. In 1997, the government of the Philippines 
also submitted a State party report to the CERD Committee, which was to be its last for over twelve years, prompting the 
Committee to commend its effort in drafting the IPRA, but also to express its concerns in relation to the negative impacts 
development projects were having on the country’s indigenous peoples.108  
 
1997 was also the year that the Subanon community located at the foot of Mt Canatuan, on the Zamboanga Peninsula of 
Mindanao, obtained its Certification of Ancestral Domain Claim (CADC) from the Philippines’ Department of the 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and commenced its engagement with the new procedures for strengthened 
rights recognition under the UNDRIP-inspired IPRA. This convergence of events offered the promise of a future based on 
respect for their inherent rights in favour of the Philippines’ indigenous peoples, such as the Subanon of Mt Canatuan. At 
that time the Subanon were involved in a struggle to protect their territories from the encroachment of a junior Canadian 
mining company, TVI Resources Development Philippines, Inc. (TVIRD). Of particular concern to the Subanon was the 
company’s intent to develop an open pit gold mine thereby, destroying the peak of their sacred mountain, Mt Canatuan. 
From 2004 on-wards the Subanon adopted an alternative strategy based on two mutually reinforcing rights assertion 
approaches. The first approach was to invoke their own customary legal system. This resulted in the issuance of two 
rulings, one against the State in 2004 and the other against the company in 2007, for violations of Subanon customary 
law. The second approach adopted by the Subanon was to focus on international fora in which to seek remedies for their 
grievances. In particular, they turned to the CERD Committee for assistance in 2007. This opened a long dialogue 
between the CERD Committee, the government and the community, as a result of which the Committee requested several 
times that the Government provide it with information in relation to steps taken to implement its recommendations. On 
the one hand, the CERD Committee recognized that positive developments had occurred; in particular, the Committee 
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welcomed “the recognition and the protection by the State party of traditional indigenous justice and conflict resolutions 
mechanisms” and its “statements that it wishes to respect the customary practices […] of the Subanon people”,109 also 
placing considerable emphasis on the role of Subanon customary law in free, prior and informed consent processes and in 
relation to ensuring culturally appropriate reparations. On the other hand, however, as of September 2015 the government 
has not yet responded to CERD Committee’s request for updated information or taken the necessary measures to 
implement its recommendations in relation to reparations due to the Subanon. 
 
This reality reveals that, to a notable extent, the post-IPRA relationship between indigenous peoples, the Philippine State 
and mining companies seeking to operate there continues to be dominated by power rather than by law. The failure to 
implement the law in accordance with its spirit and intent is simply a reflection of the extent of the power imbalances in 
governance structures at local, national, regional and international levels, all of which act in favour of mining companies 
to the detriment of indigenous peoples’ enjoyment of their rights. This reflects a general situation in the context of which 
the rights of Philippine indigenous peoples are recognized under the law but not yet fully realized in practice. 
 
AFRICA 
 
Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International (on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council) v. Kenya 
(by Ebun Abolarin, with the contribution of Alexandra Tomaselli) 
The ownership claim of the Endorois to their ancestral lands in the Lake Bogoria area is well known to the neighbouring 
tribes because the sites were used seasonally for cultural festivities that involves all Endorois form the whole region. 
Though Kenya has no domestic law or instrument with express mention of the rights of indigenous peoples, the land had 
been enjoyed without any disturbance for centuries, even under the British colonial administration. However, the 
ownership and habitation of that territory provided a close link with the land, in which the Endorois practised a 
sustainable way of life until dispossession through the creation of the Lake Hannington Game Reserve in 1973, and a 
subsequent re-gazetting of the Lake Bogoria Game Reserve in 1978 by the Government of Kenya. The Endorois were 
promised compensation of fertile land for 400 families after the creation of the game reserve, and each of the 400 families 
was to be paid 3,150 Kenyan Shillings as for relocation. However, only 170 families received some money, in 1986. The 
community claimed justice before Kenyan domestic courts, but it was denied. Therefore, their case was brought before 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Commission rendered its decision on 25 November 2009,110 
recognizing the intrinsic guiding value of the UNDRIP’s standards and finding that Kenya violated Articles 1 (obligation 
to respect rights), 8 (freedom of conscience and religion), 14 (right to property), 17 (right to take part in cultural life and 
to promotion and protection of morals and traditional values), 21 (peoples’ rights to freely dispose of their wealth and 
natural resources) and 22 (peoples’ right to their economic, social and cultural development) of the 1981 African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.111 Therefore, the Commission recommended the government of Kenya to: recognise 
rights of ownership to the Endorois and return their ancestral land to the community; ensure unrestricted access to Lake 
Bogoria and surrounding sites for religious and cultural rites and for grazing their cattle to the Endorois community; pay 
adequate compensation to the community for all the loss suffered; pay royalties to the Endorois from existing economic 
activities and ensure that they benefit from employment possibilities within the reserve; grant registration to the Endorois 
Welfare Committee; engage in dialogue with the community for the effective implementation of these recommendations; 
report on the implementation of these recommendations within three months from the date of notification. 
 
In order to persuade Kenya to implement its recommendation, in 2013 the Commission adopted a resolution calling on the 
Republic of Kenya to implement the Endorois decision,112 urging the government to comply with its obligations under the 
African Charter, including giving effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed therein, as well as to inform the 
Commission of the measures proposed to implement the Endorois decision, and more particularly, the concrete steps 
taken to engage all the players and stakeholders, including the victims, with a view to giving full effect to the decision. 
The government of Kenya has so far failed to honour its obligations arising from the Commission’s communication, but, 
in its Combined Periodic Report (CPR) of 2014113 addressed most of the issues enumerated as violations against the 
Endorois Community under its 2010 Constitution. In the CPR, Kenya claimed that, in the last few years, it had “made 
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remarkable progress in safeguarding the rights, freedoms and duties of its people [including indigenous peoples and 
socially disadvantaged persons] as enshrined in the Charter”,114 as well as that all the rights assumed as violated by the 
Commission in its recommendation are guaranteed and protected by its 2010 Constitution, hence they may be fully 
enjoyed by the Endorois who are nomadic pastoralist within their traditional lands. With respect in particular to the right 
to property, Kenya emphasized that Article 40 of the Constitution allows every person the right to acquire and own 
property, and that compensation is due to persons for land compulsorily acquired by the government; compulsory 
acquisition has to be only for public use and the Government has to pay promptly and in full.115 Despite the statements 
included in the CPR, and the effort of the Government of Kenya in late 2014 to set up a task force dedicated to the 
implementation of this ruling,116 so far Kenya has failed to implement the Endorois decision as recommended by the 
African Commission. 
 
AFTRADEMOP and Global Welfare Association (on behalf of the Moko-oh Indigenous Peoples of Cameroon) v. 
Cameroon 
(by Ebun Abolarin) 
The Association for the Reconstruction and Development of the Moko-oh Peoples of Cameroon (AFTRADEMOP) – an 
agro-pastoral (minority) people of Upper Moghamo, a clan in Batibo Sub-division of the North-west of Cameroon – and 
Global Welfare Association on behalf of the Moko-oh indigenous peoples of Cameroon filed a complaint to the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 9 February 2007.117 Though the Complaint is against the State of 
Cameroon, the oppression and domination was perpetrated by the Bali-Nyonga, a migrant tribe from Chamba in the North 
of Cameroon. The Moko-oh alleged that the domination, enslavement and oppression began during the colonial era with 
the German and British administration, which was compounded by series of raids in 1914, at the beginning of the 1st 
World War. At that period, the land of the Moko-oh was invaded by the Bali-Nyonga, a local tribe, who chased them out 
of their land to different parts of the country, while their oil and wine palm plantation were demolished.  But in 1928 a 
delimitation of the boundary between the Bali-Nyonga and the Moko-oh was carried out by the District Officer of the 
Bamenda Division, which was further inspected and confirmed by the Provincial Resident of the Cameroon Province in 
Buea in 1929. But the outright objection of the Bali-Nyonga to this officially set boundary prevented the Moko-ohs from 
returning to their village. This refusal of the Bali-Nyonga to accept the 1928 boundary adjustment led to incessant 
persecution of the Moko-oh in order to drive them perpetually out of their ancestral land. Thus, the agitation of the Moko-
oh to regain their land through all available constituted institutions in Cameroon began. The Complainant’s petitions 
before administrative authorities, seeking redress to repossess its land, was without success, and all Moko-oh 
community’s efforts to regain their land and property have been frustrated by the Cameroonian authorities. The violations 
alleged by AFTRADEMOP in its complaint concern Articles 3 (equality of all individuals before the law), 4 (right to life 
and integrity of the person), 5 (right to respect of human dignity), 10 (right to free association), 11 (right to free 
assembly), 12 (right to freedom of movement and residence), 14, 19 (right to equality of all peoples), 20 (peoples’ right to 
existence and freedom), 21, and 24 (peoples’ right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development) 
of the African Charter. The ultimate purpose of the complaint is to persuade Cameroon to return the Moko-oh their 
traditional territories on the basis of the established pre-independence boundary delimitation of 1928 and recognize them 
under domestic law, to rehabilitate the Moko-oh villages and allow the resettlement of the community there, as well as to 
protect the Moko-oh from further discrimination and oppression. 
 
San and Bakgalagadi peoples’ land rights and the case of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve in Botswana 
(by Maria Sapignoli, with the contribution of Robert K. Hitchcock, René Kuppe and Alexandra Tomaselli) 
This case study concerns the eviction of San and Bakgalagadi people, who sued the Government of Botswana and won 
two cases before domestic Courts in 2006 and 2011. The Central Kalahari Game Reserve in Botswana was established in 
1961 to protect the wildlife resources and to guarantee the hunter-gatherer San people access to land, and, thus, their 
means of livelihood. Over time, the lifestyle of the San people and other residents of the Game Reserve changed. In 1986, 
the Government decided to relocate all people residing within the Reserve to outside settlements on the grounds that the 
communities’ lifestyles were considered to be no longer consistent with the objectives of the Reserve, as they were 
allegedly depleting the wildlife and natural resources of the Reserve. The first set of removals took place in 1997. In 2002, 
the Government ceased provision of basic and essential services to the inhabitants who remained in the Game Reserve, 
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and removed the pipe and capped the borehole that brought water to inhabitants of the Reserve. Hence, 239 San and 
Bakgalagadi individuals, who had lived in the Reserve, lodged an urgent application with the High Court of Botswana, 
seeking an order declaring the termination of basic and essential services by the Government unlawful and 
unconstitutional, and declaring the Government’s obligation to restore these services and their access to the lands and 
resources within the Reserve. In December 2006, the High Court of Botswana, in the case of Roy Sesana v. the Attorney 
General, held that the “[a]pplicants were deprived of [possession of the land, which they lawfully occupied] by the 
Government forcibly or wrongly and without their consent”,118 and that the applicants have the constitutional and legal 
rights to hunt in the Reserve. Following the High Court’s decision, the government allowed to return to the Reserve only 
the applicants to the Court case. In addition, the government stated that it is not obligated to provide access to water in the 
Reserve and that it will not permit the inhabitants to gain access to water through the use of the Mothomelo borehole. 
Later, on 27 January 2011, the San people won an appeal against the Government in the Botswana Court of Appeal.119 
The Appeal Judges quashed the previous ruling of Justice Walia that denied people access to water on their ancestral land 
and referred to Kalahari people’s plight as “a harrowing story of human suffering and despair caused by a shortage of 
water in the harsh climatic conditions of the Kalahari Desert”.120 Furthermore, the Government was ordered to pay the 
costs of the San people’s appeal. 
 
The two decisions just described certainly represent positive developments in terms of compliance with the standards set 
by the UNDRIP. So far, however, the judgements have not been implemented by the government of Botswana. In 
February 2015 Roy Sesana, first applicant in the 2006 case, met with President Khama. At the end of this meeting the 
President decided to direct several ministers to go to the central Kalahari and discuss the issues that people in the Central 
Kalahari Game Reserve were concerned about. Following the visit, the ministers made several promises concerning 
initiatives aimed at facilitating life in the Reserve (including the commitments of providing a mobile health clinic for the 
settlements in the reserve, of transporting children living in the Reserve back and forth to school, or to provide pensions to 
the elderly people qualified to receive them), but, as of March 2016, none of these promises have been acted upon. As a 
consequence, it cannot be said that at the moment of this writing the applicants have been completely satisfied by the 
outcome of the two cases, since they still lack hunting rights, access to water in some communities, and the ability to 
move in and out of the reserve freely and to stay there as long as they wish. 
 
Realizing Land Rights of the Nuba People in Sudan 
(by Jernej Letnar Černič) 
This case study studies deals with land rights of the Nuba people, which are an indigenous ethnic group living in the area 
of the Nuba mountains in Southern Kordofan in Sudan. They include a variety of tribes in the Nuba mountains. The land 
is central to the Nuba peoples’ cultural existence, language, customs, identity, and socio-economic survival, and is critical 
to the community’s survival. Customary laws have traditionally regulated land tenure in the Nuba mountains. However, 
the Sudanese land tenure system has undermined the ancestral land rights of the Nuba people.121 In particular, the 
government has seriously disregarded the Nuba peoples’ ancestral lands and their individual and collective human rights. 
The Nuba peoples have been pushed “systematically to the margin of their customarily owned land”.122 Most recently, 
The New York Times reported, on 3 July 2011, that the Sudanese army has “been relentlessly pounding the Nuba 
Mountains from Russian-made Antonov bombers for weeks […] Hundreds of civilians have been killed, including many 
children. Bombs have been dropped on huts, on farmers in the field, on girls fetching water together, slicing them in half 
with buckets in their hands”.123 So far, no case or claim has been brought to enforce Nuba’s land rights or their human 
rights generally speaking, and their current situation constitutes an evident violation of Sudan’s international obligations 
towards indigenous peoples. Therefore, the government of Sudan should be urged to strengthen its national judicial 
system, as well as to ratify the relevant international treaties – including the 1966 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR124 – so 
as to ensure access to justice in favour of the Nuba for the violations of their land rights and other human rights of which 
they are victim. 
 
OCEANIA 
 
Te Urewera: Return and Co-Management of Traditional Lands of the Tuhoe People, Aotearoa New Zealand 
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(by Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes)***** 
Te Urewera National Park was a large park created from ancestral lands of the indigenous Tuhoe people. As part of the 
New Zealand attempt to provide redress and reparations for historic grievances including such land takings, agreement 
was recently reached whereby the New Zealand government passed legislation removing the national park status, creating 
a separate legal personality which holds title to its own lands, and enabling Tuhoe to co-manage the new entity, Te 
Urewera. The Tuhoe people argue that it is only through the exercise of their traditional relationship with the land and its 
natural environment that they would be able to exercise their spiritual authority through guardianship. The Crown was 
unable to agree to transferring ownership of a national park to a Maori tribe, but instead offered Tuhoe the solution of 
legal personality for the park, whereby no one owned the park but it owned itself. It would remain protected, with public 
use, akin to a national park, but it would maintain its own separate identity and be governed very differently, with 
significant Tuhoe input and in a way which better respects Tuhoe cosmology and relationship with the lands. This 
agreement was finalised in March 2013 and legislation to implement it passed in July 2014.125 The purpose of the Act 
reflects various aspects, particularly “to establish and preserve in perpetuity a legal identity and protected status for Te 
Urewera for its intrinsic worth, its distinctive natural and cultural values, the integrity of those values, and for its national 
importance, and in particular to — (a) strengthen and maintain the connection between Tūhoe and Te Urewera; and (b) 
preserve as far as possible the natural features and beauty of Te Urewera, the integrity of its indigenous ecological 
systems and biodiversity, and its historical and cultural heritage; and (c) provide for Te Urewera as a place for public use 
and enjoyment, for recreation, learning, and spiritual reflection, and as an inspiration for all”.126 As for the principles 
governing the implementation of the Act, they focus primarily on different aspects of environmental protection, but are 
also protective of indigenous relationships with the park, and of public access for the benefit of all New Zealanders.127  
 
EUROPE 
 
The Rönnbäcken Case 
(by Maja K. Eriksson) 
The Rönnbäcken case deals with a concession which has been granted to an international corporation (Nickel Mountain 
AB) to establish three open pit mines (K No. 1-3) to be used for about 27 years within a traditional reindeer herding 
territory, without asking for and receiving the consent of the Sámi village Vapsten. The members of Vapsten have 
officially declared that they have no intention whatsoever to offer their consent to the mining project and to the 
corporation to entry on the territory in question. The refusal to give their consent should have some implications, e.g. that 
the activities should be discontinued, but the Swedish laws and the ways that authorities interpret them have not granted 
any protection to the Sámi in the area. Sámi did complain on the basis of the mining code but the government rejected 
their claim. For this reason, the Sámi made an application comprising an urgent request for interim measures, which is a 
tool for preventing human rights violations and irreparable damage, to the CERD Committee in September 2013. The 
claim was presented by the Sámi Council together with a Sámi community (Vapstens sameby). It was based on the 
assumption of the Vapsten’s members (16 persons) that the decision to grant permission for the mine constitutes a 
violation of the right to property in conjunction with an arguable claim of discrimination, and a violation of the right to 
effective remedy, in combination with the right to equal treatment before tribunals, in breach of, respectively, Articles 
5(d)(v), 6 and 5(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. At the time of writing, 
the communication is still pending. 
 
It is to be noted that in Sweden, a dualist country, courts are not used to apply any other international human rights 
instrument than the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights,128 which is directly applicable law. Unfortunately, so 
far the European Court of Human Rights has not shown particular sensibility (contrary to other human rights bodies, e.g. 
the IACtHR) as regards the application of general human rights provisions to indigenous peoples. This explains why there 
is a clear discrepancy between what international law requires in terms of indigenous peoples and how domestic law has 
been interpreted and applied in Sweden. Also, domestic law presently in force in Sweden is not supportive of Sámi land 
rights, and may therefore have severe and adverse impact on reindeer herding. Yet, there are positive recent signs within 
the Swedish legal court system paying more attention to international law standards related to indigenous peoples. 
 
Case Study of Norway: How Norway’s International Law Obligations vis-à-vis the Sámi Indigenous Peoples’ Land 
Rights have been Implemented in Practice 
(by Øyvind Ravna and Timo Koivurova) 
                                                 
***** This text is an extract from Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes, “Maori Cultural Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand: Protecting the 
Cosmology that Protects the Environment”, 21 Widener Law Review 2, 2015, pp.273-327. 
125 See Te Urewera Act 2014, available at <http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2014/0051/latest/whole.html#DLM6183609> 
(accessed 27 May 2016). 
126 Ibid., Part 1, Subpart 1, Section 4, “Purpose of this Act”. 
127 Ibid., Part 1, Subpart 1, Section 5, “Principles for Implementing this Act”. 
128 CETS No. 005. 
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This case study concentrates on how land rights of Sámi indigenous people in Norway have been identified and given 
legal recognition, in particular in the northernmost Finnmark County. Norway was the first country in the world to ratify 
ILO Convention 169, in 1990,129 as, and, as required by the Convention, in 2005 enacted the Finnmark Act130 to, inter 
alia, identify and recognize, through specific procedures, indigenous specific Sámi land and water rights within that 
county. The fact that Norway has ratified and implemented ILO Convention 169 in its domestic law is notable also for the 
reason that the other countries where Sámi also live (Finland, Sweden or Russia) have not ratified the Convention nor 
have they tried to establish any procedures to investigate and recognize Sámi land and water rights. 
 
The Finnmark Act incorporates ILO Convention 169, which in Article 8(1) establishes that, “in applying national laws 
and regulations to the peoples concerned, due regard is to be given to their customs or customary laws”. To this purpose, 
the Act is grounded on the assumption that, when establishing special procedures for clarifying land ownership by the 
Sámi, their customs and legal opinions should be taken into account, basing on applicable national law. With a view of 
implementing ILO Convention 169 (particularly Articles 14 and 15, on land rights), Norway has transferred the 
ownership of 95% of the lands and waters of Finnmark county to its residents; they are administered by the so called 
Finnmark Estate, consisting of 3 members appointed by the Sámi Parliament and 3 by the Finnmark County Council 
The main procedural tool established by the Finnmark Act is a commission (the Finnmark Commission) mandated to 
investigate and adjudicate Sámi land and water rights in Finnmark. In addition, a special tribunal (The Uncultivated Land 
Tribunal of Finnmark) has the task to settle disputes concerning such rights arising from the investigation of the 
Commission. These procedures, however, are not reserved to the Sámi, but are open to all Finnmark County residents, 
circumstance which is being criticized. 
 
In principle, Norway has created a legislative framework (although only for Finnmark) which should be able to process 
claims of immemorial ownership and use rights of indigenous Sámi. Unfortunately this is not the case. In fact, in the five 
cases where the Finnmark Commission has so far provided a report, it has not taken appropriately into account Sámi 
customary law, or oral evidence, and has mostly proceeded from the basis that Norway has by now established legal 
ownership to these lands. Only in one case, in the small abandoned coastal Sámi village of Gulgofjord, the Commission 
has found that local people have acquired ownership to an outlying area of 30 square kilometers. However, the case was 
not of any practical significance, since the Commission concluded that the owners (mostly successors of coastal Sámi 
living there up to 1970) would need to move back to such abandoned village, a roadless village by the ocean, to acquire 
the title. In the four other investigation fields, the Commission has not followed what the legislature stipulated in the 
Finnmark Act, namely, the importance of Sámi use of lands or Sámi customary law. Instead, it has found that 
governmental activities, rather than the local, informal management of natural resources, are of law-making significance. 
As a consequence, Norway has received rather hash criticism from the CERD Committee, which has noted, among other 
things, that “there remain significant gaps in translating the legal recognition into practice, thus resulting in reality in 
limited recognition and protection of rights over their lands”.131 
 
The behaviour of the government of Norway is also in contravention of Article 27 ICCPR,132 incorporated into Norwegian 
Law by the 1999 Human Rights Act,133 with higher authority than an ordinary Act of the Parliament. Article 27 ICCPR is 
of particular interest for this case study, especially in light of the interpretation given to it by the Human Rights 
Committee,134 which conceives the provision in point as the substantial basis for a minority’s culture, including, e.g., a 
particular way of life associated with the use of land resources. In relation to the Sámi, this means that lands, pastures, 
waters, and other natural resources of importance for traditional livelihoods enjoy legal protection against interference by 
the government that could threaten the exercise of Sámi culture and livelihood – both for individuals and communities. In 
addition, Article 27 ICCPR implies an obligation by the government to identify lands of indigenous peoples, further 
strengthening Sámi land rights. The Norwegian government supports this interpretation. 
 
Land and Fishing Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Russia 
(by Federica Prina and Alexandra Tomaselli) 
In the Russian Federation, 46 peoples have been legally recognized as “small-in-number indigenous peoples of the North, 
Siberia and the Far East”. Russia has not ratified ILO Convention 169, and abstained from voting for the UNDRIP. 
                                                 
129 See n. 22 above. 
130 Act No. 85 of June 17, 2005 relating to Legal Relations and Management of Land and Natural Resources in the County of 
Finnmark, available at <http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=11129> (accessed 27 May 2016). 
131 See Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations on the twenty-first and twenty-second 
periodic reports of Norway, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/NOR/CO/21-22 of 28 August 2005, para. 29. 
132 See n. 23 above. 
133 Act relating to the strengthening of the status of human rights in Norwegian law, available at <http://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-
lover/data/lov-19990521-030-eng.pdf> (accessed 27 May 2016). 
134 See n. 24 above and corresponding text. 
 School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow (Scotland). 
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Regarding the former, the Russian Parliament held two hearings on its potential ratification in 1994 and in 2006, but both 
ended with a rejection based on the assumption that the Convention is incompatible with Russian legislation. As to the 
latter, during its second Universal Periodic Review in 2013, Russia stated that it had no intention to approve or endorse 
the UNDRIP, affirming that it already complied with the standards enshrined in it. Indigenous peoples are constitutionally 
recognized in Article 69 of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation, stating that “[t]he Russian Federation shall 
guarantee the rights of the small-in-number indigenous peoples in accordance with the universally recognized principles 
and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation”. This article was legally implemented 
by the adoption of three federal laws, which specifically apply to indigenous peoples, namely the Laws “On Guarantees” 
(1999), “On Obshchinas” (2000), and “On Territories” (2001).135 Formally, these laws provide indigenous peoples with a 
number of individual and collective rights, guaranteeing, inter alia, the right to freely use land and renewable natural 
resources in the territories they traditionally occupy, and areas where they engage in traditional economic activities (“On 
Guarantees”, Article 8, para.1). However, problems seem to lie in the effective implementation of the laws or their 
constant amendment. For instance, Article 11 of the original text of the Law “On Territories” stated that the use of 
territories of traditional natural use (in Russian: Territorii Traditsionnogo Prirodopol’zovaniya, hereinafter TTP) shall be 
free of charge. However, the Russian government has undermined the right of the indigenous peoples to free land use by 
amending Article 11 through Federal Law No.118-FZ of 2007. It has also failed to designate such TTP at the federal 
level. Regarding fishing rights, Article 25 of the Russian Federal Law No.166-FZ of 2004 “On fishery and the protection 
of biological water resources” foresees an exception clause for indigenous peoples from the requirement of holding a 
fishing permit, when fishing is carried out to satisfy subsistence needs and follows traditional practices at the level of the 
indigenous community. This provision is also poorly applied. 
 
At the same time, indigenous peoples have recently successfully litigated to uphold their fishing rights before domestic 
Russian courts, in order to guarantee the community’s livelihood. In some cases, Russian courts have appeared biased and 
given reasons for concern, showing that the Russian judiciary is not always fully independent, and there have been 
instances of judges being subjected to pressure from various actors. At the same time, in other cases Russian courts 
(including the Supreme Court) have provided some protection to indigenous peoples, ruling on a number of indirect or 
direct safeguards. First, they have affirmed that settlements of indigenous peoples shall be taken into consideration prior 
to the elaboration and issuing of documents on fishing grounds used for industrial fishing.136 Secondly, they have 
guaranteed a (fairer) procedure in the bids for both hunting and fishing licenses, thereby indirectly underlining how 
indigenous peoples may be easily excluded from such tenders.137 Thirdly, they have stressed that indigenous peoples have 
the right to pursue their traditional lifestyle and economic activity, as well as to access land free of charge.138 Fourthly, 
one court of second instance directly referred to the exception clause for indigenous peoples from the requirement of 
holding a fishing permit, when fishing is carried out to satisfy subsistence needs and follow traditional practices.139 
Finally, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), in its ruling of 2014, upheld indigenous peoples’ 
right to priority in the exploitation of wildlife and referred to mechanisms of settlement in cases of land disputes that take 
into account the culture of indigenous peoples.140 In these cases, the courts have observed, although by no mean explicitly, 
the relevant standards contained in the UNDRIP. We may therefore conclude that a few of the standards of the UNDRIP 
regarding indigenous peoples’ land and fishing rights have been (partially) echoed in Russian Federation’s domestic 
jurisprudence, although it is very difficult to establish whether Russian courts may have been aware of such standards. 
This ultimately supports the argument of the universal value of the UNDRIP. 
 
In practice, sometimes indigenous peoples face many difficulties in bringing their cases to courts, which suggests that 
many violations of their rights are often ignored; and, when cases are adjudicated by courts, it remains unclear whether 
the resulting rulings are fully executed. At the same time, however, Russian courts may play a significant role in the 
protection of indigenous peoples, as shown by the cases just summarily described. Furthermore, the Law “On Guarantees” 
states at Article 14 that “[indigenous peoples have] the right to judicial defence of their ancestral lands, traditional way of 
life, economic activity and traditional practices […] In the consideration by courts of cases involving indigenous peoples 
[…] the traditions and customs of these peoples can be taken into account, when they do not contradict federal legislation 
                                                 
135 Respectively, Law No.82-FZ “On Guarantees of the Rights of Small-in-Number Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Federation” 
(“On Guarantees”), adopted in 1999; Law No.104-FZ “On General Principles of the Organization of Obshchinas of Small-in-Number 
Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation” (“On Obshchinas”), adopted in 2000; and Law 
No.49-FZ “On Territories of Traditional Nature Use of the Small-in-Number Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East 
of the Russian Federation” (“On Territories”), adopted in 2001.  
136 See Obshchina ‘Kignach’ v. the governor of Kamchatka Krai, Supreme Court, 2009. 
137 See Obshchina Saur v. Fishery agency of Amur oblast, Arbitrazh Court of Appeal, 2011; Federal anti-monopoly agency of 
Primorskii Krai v. the administration of Primorskii Krai, 5thArbitrazh Court of Appeal, 2012. 
138 See Obshchina Saur v. Fishery agency of Amur oblast and Prosecutor of Primorskii Krai v. four individuals belonging to an 
indigenous people of Primorskii Krai, General Court of 2nd instance, 2011. 
139 See Prosecutor of Primorskii Krai v. four individuals belonging to an indigenous people of Primorskii Krai. 
140 See MP of the Republic of Sakha V.H. Gubarev on the constitutionality of Point 200 of Order No. 285. 
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and the laws of the subjects of the Russian Federation. For the effective judicial protection of the rights of indigenous 
peoples, authorised representatives of small-in-number peoples can participate in the said judicial defence”. Therefore, the 
members of indigenous communities and their associations are guaranteed by law a special regime of legal protection, 
with the participation of members of these groups themselves, so as to ensure the fairness of proceedings. 
 
4. Overall Assessment and Preliminary Conclusion****** 
The analysis of the case studies just presented has drawn an overall picture looking like a double-sided coin. 
On the one hand, only a few cases are characterized by blatant violations of international legal standards applicable to 
indigenous peoples. In most cases, indigenous peoples’ rights are actually recognized by States, especially at the level of 
the legislature and the judiciary. This consideration applies not only as regards States parties to ILO Convention 169, but 
more generally to the majority of States considered in this report, irrespective of whether or not they have ratified the said 
convention. This further confirms the status of the main international legal standards concerning the rights of indigenous 
peoples as principles of customary international law, with respect to which the State behaviour just described attains the 
role of practice accompanied by opinio juris. The fact that in some cases violations take place do not militate in any way 
against this conclusion. In fact, as noted by the ILA Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, quoting the ICJ, 
“‘for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must [not] be in absolutely rigorous conformity 
with the rule”, on the condition that ‘instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been 
treated as breaches of that rule’. The fact that the said negative examples are actually treated as violations is demonstrated 
by the univocal and virtually unanimous condemnation of them by the international community, including U.N. 
bodies”.141 In fact, in virtually all cases discussed in the previous section, the existence of a State obligation to respect the 
said standards is unanimously and unquestionably confirmed by international courts and other human rights monitoring 
bodies. Even when the position of the latter courts and bodies “is based on the prospective violation that the behaviour in 
point may produce with respect to obligations arising from treaties binding the State concerned, the multilateral treaties 
pertinent to indigenous peoples’ […] rights – taken as a whole – form a thick network of obligations which affect virtually 
every government in the world”.142 
 
On the other hand, the dark side of the coin is represented by the rather unsatisfactory degree of practical implementation 
and effective realization of the rights of indigenous peoples, especially on the executive and administrative level, which 
characterize a good number of the case studies described in the previous section. One might assert that this is a fate 
characterizing human rights generally speaking, as at the present stage of evolution of international human rights law the 
effective degree of implementation of either human rights rules in general or decisions of human rights monitoring bodies 
in particular is in many ways problematic at the global level. It is true that the phase of the implementation of the existing 
standards in daily reality is the more complicated one to achieve in practice, as it is influenced by a number of meta-legal 
factors, including economic, social, cultural and political considerations. The fact remains, however, that the phase of 
implementation is the most important one to give effectiveness to human rights – i.e. to make it possible that human 
rights, including indigenous peoples’ rights, are actually and fully enjoyed by the intended beneficiaries of the relevant 
rules. In fact, recognizing and proclaiming human rights on paper is not enough, as they must find realization in the real 
world. It is true that some lack of implementation does not allow to cast doubts on the actual existence and validity of the 
relevant standards as rules of international law which States are bound to respect and to which they are obliged to give 
effectiveness. However, if these standards are not properly implemented, human rights (including indigenous peoples’ 
rights) fail to achieve their paramount purpose, i.e. to ensure their effective enjoyment by individuals and communities. 
The preliminary conclusion which can be drawn from the work carried out so far by the present Committee is twofold. 
Indeed, on the one hand, further developments in the field of international law on indigenous peoples are necessary in 
order to remove and prevent the situations that still exist in the world characterized by blatant violations committed by 
States in breach of legal standards existing in the field. On the other hand, it is at the same time indispensable to work on 
the phase of implementation, beginning from promoting a general awareness that such a phase is fundamental for 
ensuring effective realization of human rights. Too often, in fact, experts, practitioners and even common people celebrate 
domestic and international judgments adjudicating indigenous peoples’ rights as huge victories, but then they lose sight of 
the phase of implementation, de facto leaving some governments free to continue to deny such rights at the political level 
through not properly implementing the relevant judicial decisions. 
 
5. Future Work of the Committee 
In view of the 2018 Biennial Conference of ILA, when the mandate of the Committee will expire, we plan to concentrate 
on the following activities: 
                                                 
****** This Section has been written by Federico Lenzerini, Co-Rapporteur of the Committee. As it is made clear in the title of this 
section, the conclusions drawn herein are only preliminary and based on the case studies assessed by the Committee so far. These 
conclusions, therefore, may be subject to revision in the course of the future work of the Committee. 
141 See Final Report, “Sofia Conference (2012)”, p. 27, quoting ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14, para. 186. 
142 See ILA Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Final Report, “Sofia Conference (2012)”, p. 27. 
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 further examination of already assessed case-studies which at present are still pending; 
 selection and study of other cases of interest for our research; 
 investigation of the legal, quasi-legal and practical barriers blocking the road from international legal standards to 
effective protection in a number of areas of the world; 
 elaboration of suggestions and recommendations (including, if opportune, suggestions and recommendations 
addressed to specific States with respect to particular cases) aimed at removing and preventing violations of 
indigenous peoples’ rights by States; 
 elaboration of suggestions and recommendations for improving the phase of implementation of domestic and 
international decisions adjudicating and/or affirming the rights of indigenous peoples; 
 identification and selection of best practices relating to countries that have, or are attempting to, implement 
UNDRIP (and other relevant instruments’) standards and provisions, and evaluation of how such practices could 
be applied to other areas, taking into account existing cultural and social differences; 
 definition of strategies which might be applied worldwide by legal researchers and activists; 
 preparation of suggestions and recommendations for involving the private sector, including national and 
multinational enterprises, in the elaboration and realization of concrete strategies for making indigenous peoples’ 
rights – especially land rights – effective; 
 elaboration of final conclusions based on a wider range of case studies. 
